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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DOUGLAS L. STOWELL, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY W. OSTLER, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
OSTLER INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation; OSTLER PROPERTY 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation; 
DALE OSTLER; and VYRON OSTLER, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20050636-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES OSTLER INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND 
OSTLER PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
I. STATEMENT CONCERNING JURISDICTION 
This case is an appeal of an order of dismissal entered by the Third Judicial 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2-2(j). 
II. CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Copies of controlling statutory provisions are included in Addendum No. 1 
attached to this brief, and include the following: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-728 
UTAH CODE ANN. § l6-10a-732 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-801 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-805 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-810 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-8 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732 is mandatory and unambiguously 
dictates that a shareholder agreement providing for management of a corporation in a 
manner inconsistent with the Utah Corporation Act is invalid if not in writing. 
(Preserved for appeal at Record on Appeal ("ROA") pp. 39-52, 322-323.) 
2. Whether UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732 requires that a shareholder 
agreement providing for management of a corporation in a manner inconsistent with the 
Utah Corporation Act expires after ten years when the term agreed upon by the parties in 
the alleged agreement is indefinite. (Preserved for appeal at ROA pp. 113-138, 322-323.) 
3. Whether an alleged shareholder agreement providing for the management 
of a corporation in a manner inconsistent with the Utah Corporation Act is inheritable 
when the agreement would require a personal relationship among shareholders in 
managing the corporation, including establishing and implementing all company policies 
and programs, developing business ventures, and making decisions concerning the use of 
profits. (Preserved for appeal at ROA pp. 39-52, 324.) 
4. Whether the trial court properly dismissed the Estate's Claims when the 
Estate concedes that all claims for damages are barred by UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1) 
and the equitable remedy of specific performance is not available to compel parties to 
engage in a personal relationship of trust in managing and operating a business. 
(Preserved for appeal at ROA pp. 272-275.) 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The district court dismissed the complaint in this matter pursuant to UTAH RULE 
Civ. P. 12(b)6. Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)6 is reviewed for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's decision. Educators Mutual Ins. 
Ass 'n. v. Allied Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff/Appellant in this matter is Douglas Stowell, an attorney who is acting 
as the personal representative of the estate of Gary Ostler (the Plaintiff/Appellant is 
hereinafter referred to as the "Estate" and Gary Ostler is hereinafter referred to as 
"Gary"). After Gary's death, the Estate brought this action against Gary's brother, Dale 
Ostler (hereinafter "Dale"), another brother Vyron Ostler ("Vyron"), and 
Defendants/Appellees Ostler International, Inc. and Ostler Property Development, Inc. 
(these companies are hereinafter referred to as the "Corporate Defendants"). The 
complaint seeks to enforce an alleged oral agreement between Dale and Gary, as 
shareholders, concerning how the Corporate Defendants would be managed. The trial 
court granted the motions to dismiss filed by Dale, Vyron, and the Corporate Defendants, 
and this appeal followed. 
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court concluded that (1) The shareholder 
agreement alleged in the complaint would purport to permit the Corporate Defendants "to 
operate outside of the requirements" of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
(hereinafter the "Corporation Act") (ROA, p. 322-323)1; (2) UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-
10a-732(2) is mandatory, and requires that the kind of shareholder agreement alleged in 
the complaint "shall be" in writing to be in enforceable (Id); (3) Even if the 
shareholder agreement were otherwise enforceable, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732(2) 
provides that the kind of shareholder agreement alleged in the complaint would expire 
after ten years unless the parties agreed to a different term (Id); (4) The agreement as 
alleged in the complaint was personal to Gary and Dale and ended when Gary died (ROA 
p. 324). 
The complaint in this matter alleges an oral agreement between Dale and Gary, 
dating from the time the Corporate Defendants were incorporated, that neither of the 
Corporate Defendants would implement any policy or business practice without the 
consent of both Gary and Dale as shareholders. The complaint bases the alleged oral 
agreement at least in part upon "custom, usage, and course of dealing," (Id. at ^ | 27 & 
33, ROA, pp. 7-8 & 10-11). Ostler International was incorporated in 1988 and Ostler 
Property was incorporated in 1993. (Id at ffl| 8 & 9, ROA pp. 2 & 3). Dale and Gary 
each owned fifty percent of the stock of the Corporate Defendants. (Complaint, ^ 3-4, 
ROA p. 2.2) 
After Gary's death, Dale appointed Vyron to fill Gary's vacant seat on the boards 
of directors of the Corporate Defendants. (ROA, pp. 42-43.) In the Complaint, the Estate 
1
 A copy of the trial court's decision is attached as Addendum No. 2. 
2
 The Complaint is attached hereto as Addendum No. 3. 
claims to be the successor in interest to the alleged agreement between Dale and Gary, 
and asserts that since Gary's death, Dale, Vyron, and the Corporate Defendants have not 
permitted the Estate to participate in the management of the companies. (Id. at \ 25, 
ROA, pp. 6-7) The Estate requests damages as well as an order compelling the Corporate 
Defendants to permit the Estate to participate in adopting and implementing all business 
decisions and practices of the Corporate Defendants, including decisions concerning the 
use of profits. (Id. at f t 31 & 37, ROA pp. 9 &11). 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Estate concedes that its complaint in this matter is premised upon an alleged 
shareholder agreement that provided for a manner of governing the Corporate Defendants 
that is inconsistent with the Corporation Act. The agreement is inconsistent with the 
Corporation Act because the agreement provided for the management of the Corporate 
Defendants by their shareholders rather than by a board of directors. The Corporation 
Act requires that corporations "must" have a board of directors and the directors "shall" 
manage corporations. Because the shareholder agreement is inconsistent with the 
Corporation Act, the agreement is only enforceable and valid if it complies with UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732. 
Section 732 requires that shareholder agreements that are inconsistent with the 
Corporation Act "shall" be in writing. Section 732 further requires that unless the parties 
agree to a different term, shareholder agreements that are inconsistent with the 
Corporation Act will expire after ten years. Section 732 uses the mandatory word 
"shall," and courts are left with no choice but to apply the plain language of a mandatory 
statute. The shareholder agreement alleged in the complaint is invalid because it was not 
in writing. In addition, even if it were enforceable, it has expired under the ten year term 
imposed by the statute. 
Because § 732 is clear and unambiguous, the Court need not look to secondary 
sources, such as the official commentary, to construe it. In any event, the official 
commentary supports the trial court's determination that the shareholder agreement is 
unenforceable. According to the official commentary, one of the purposes of § 732 is to 
provide "predictability" and "legal certainty" concerning shareholder agreements. The 
statute seeks to obtain this goal by requiring a written agreement setting out the terms of 
the agreement. The oral shareholder agreement alleged in the complaint, which is based 
upon "custom, usage, and course of dealing," does not comport with the statute's purpose 
of obtaining "predictability" and "legal certainty" through a written agreement. 
The Estate's position in this case is premised upon the assumption that the alleged 
agreement between Gary and Dale is inheritable as a matter of law. This position is in 
error. Some contract rights are personal to the holder and may not be inherited or 
assigned, including rights where personal needs and trust are dominant. The Estate's 
complaint in this matter asserts that Gary and Dale agreed to operate the Corporate 
Defendants informally, similar to a partnership. This may be permissible as long as the 
agreement complies with UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732. However, the right to 
participate in management of a business as a partner is highly personal in nature, and 
should not be involuntarily imposed upon anyone. The Estate's position would lead to an 
absurd and unworkable result, requiring that the heirs of Gary and Dale are forever 
compelled to engage in a personal relationship of trust in managing the business. 
The only potential remedy at issue in this case is whether the Estate may obtain an 
order of specific performance requiring Dale and the heirs of Gary to work together in 
managing the business of the Corporate Defendants. The Estate agrees that any damage 
claim it may have is barred by the statute of frauds as found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-
4(1), thus leaving at issue only the claims seeking specific performance. However, courts 
refuse to order specific performance of agreements, such as partnership agreements, that 
would require parties to work together in personal relationships of trust. Courts also 
decline to order specific performance when to do so would impose a heavy burden of 
ongoing judicial supervision and intervention. Requiring unwilling parties to work 
together perpetually as partners is obviously problematic. It will result in uncertainty and 
contention related to the management of the Corporate Defendants and will require 
ongoing judicial intervention. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732 is MANDATORY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY DICTATES 
THAT A SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR MANAGEMENT OF A 
CORPORATION IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE CORPORATION ACT IS 
INVALID IF NOT IN WRITING. 
The Estate's Complaint in this matter attempts to allege an oral agreement 
whereby Gary and Dale, as shareholders of the corporations, would always manage the 
companies jointly, and the companies could not implement any policy or business 
decision without the consent of both. As conceded by the Estate, these allegations assert 
an oral shareholder agreement concerning how the companies would be managed that is 
not consistent with the Corporation Act. Since this oral management agreement is 
inconsistent with the Corporation Act, the plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 16- 10a-
732 dictates that it is invalid because it is not in writing. The language of § 732 is clear 
and unambiguous, and the court need not resort to secondary sources to construe the 
statute. In any event, even if secondary sources are considered, the official commentary 
to the statute supports the position that oral shareholder agreements inconsistent with the 
Corporation Act are invalid. 
1. The Alleged Shareholder Agreement is Not Consistent with the Corporation Act 
The Corporation Act outlines how corporations are created and managed. The Act 
provides that shareholders elect directors, and directors, not shareholders, manage 
corporations. Section 801 of the Act provides as follows: 
(1) Except as provided in Section 16-10a-732, each corporation must have a 
board of directors. 
(2) All corporate power shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and 
the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction 
of, its board of directors, subject to any limitations set forth in the 
articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under Section 
16-10a-732. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-801. 
The Corporation Act includes a comprehensive mechanism that outlines how 
directors are appointed. It provides that directors' terms expire at annual shareholder 
3
 In the trial court, the parties and the court addressed issues concerning the retroactive 
application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732. The Estate has not addressed this issue in 
its opening brief, and thereby has waived any argument with respect to this issue. 
Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 80 P.3d 546, 500 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
meetings. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-805. Shareholders are also entitled to participate 
in elections for directors. Section 728 of the Corporation Act provides that in electing 
directors, each shareholder is entitled to one vote for each share and "has the right to cast 
. . . all of the votes to which the shareholder's shares are entitled for as many persons as 
there are directors to be elected and for whose election the shareholder has the right to 
vote." UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-728(l). In addition, the Act provides that "directors 
are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election." 
Id. 
The Act also addresses how director seats are filled in the event a vacancy occurs 
before an annual meeting at which directors are elected. The Act provides that the board 
of directors may fill the vacancy. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-810(l)(b). The Act also 
addresses what would happen in the event directors are not elected at annual meetings, 
stating that a director appointed prior to the meeting "continues to serve until the election 
and qualification of a successor." Id. at § 16-10a-805(5). 
Thus, ownership of shares gives shareholders the right to participate in elections 
for directors, but not necessarily the right to participate in managing a company. 
Management is exclusively within the power of directors, and ownership of shares does 
not assure appointment to the board. Therefore, as the Estate concedes, the shareholder 
agreement alleged in the complaint is not consistent with the Corporation Act. 
2. Because the Alleged Shareholder Agreement is Not Consistent with the Corporation 
Act, the Mandatory Language of§§ 732 and 801 Dictates that the Agreement is 
Invalid Because it is Not in Writing. 
As noted above, § 801 of the Corporation Act mandates that all corporations 
"must have a board of directors" and "[a] 11 corporate powers shall be exercised by or 
under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the 
direction of, its board of directors . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-801 (emphasis 
added). Section 801 also states that "an agreement authorized under Section 16-10a-732" 
may create an exception to the ordinary rule of management by the board of directors. Id. 
Section 732 of the Corporation Act outlines how shareholders may establish a 
structure for corporate management that is different from what is outlined in § 801. 
Subsection one of § 732 states that 
(1) An agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that complies 
with this section is effective among the shareholders and the 
corporation even though it is inconsistent with one or more other 
provisions of this chapter . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732(l). Subsection one of § 732 then outlines, by 
illustration, the types of agreements that may be the subject of a valid shareholder 
agreement. Subsection one, for example, authorizes agreements that eliminate the board 
of directors or restrict its powers. It also authorizes agreements that establish different 
procedures for selecting directors and establishing their terms of service. Notably, § 732 
applies to agreements that are "inconsistent" with the Corporation Act. In other words, 
§ 732 is broad and its applicability is not limited to those circumstances where a 
shareholder agreement is not only inconsistent but also invalid and unenforceable due to 
the inconsistency. 
Subsection two of § 732 establishes formal requirements for putting in place a 
shareholders' agreement that is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that 
corporations "must" have a board of directors and directors "shall" manage all affairs of 
corporations. Subsection two states as follows: 
(2) An agreement authorized by this section shall be: 
(a) set forth: 
(i) in the articles of incorporation or bylaws and approved by 
all persons who are shareholders at the time of the agreement; or 
(ii) in a written agreement that is signed by all persons who 
are shareholders at the time of the agreement and is made known to 
the corporation; 
(b) subject to amendment only by all persons who are 
shareholders at the time of the amendment, unless the agreement 
provides otherwise; and 
(c) valid for 10 years, unless the agreement provides otherwise. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732(2). Notably, similar to § 801, this subsection uses the 
mandatory phrase "shall" in describing the legislature's intent. 
Despite § 732's mandate that shareholder agreements by in writing, the Estate 
argues that § 732 of the Corporation Act does not invalidate the alleged oral management 
agreement described in the complaint. The Estate contends that § 732 merely validates 
agreements that comply with § 732's provisions, but does not, on the other hand, 
invalidate agreements that fail to comply with § 732. The Estate argues that the intent of 
the statutory provisions is merely to validate written agreements, and leaves open the 
question of whether oral agreements are valid. The estate contends that the validity of 
oral agreements "depends on their terms and other contractual formalities and the 
performance of the shareholders in response thereto." (Appellant's Brief, p. 14.) This 
assertion is contrary to the clear language of the Corporation Act. 
In construing a statute, a court is required to apply the plain language of the 
statute. A court is required to "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and 
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Nelson v. Salt 
Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). When the language employed by the 
legislature "is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no 
room is left for construction." Id. (quoting Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, 
Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995)). The court will examine secondary 
sources such as statutory history and relevant policy considerations only if the statute is 
ambiguous. Id. 
In the present case, the language of the relevant statutory provisions is plain and 
unambiguous. The statutory provisions provide that shareholders have the right to elect 
directors, but not to manage corporations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-728. The 
provisions further provide that a corporation "must have a board of directors" and that 
"all corporate powers shall be exercised by the board." Id. at § 801 (emphasis added). 
Although the Corporation Act authorizes an exception to this ordinary mandate for board 
governance, the Corporation Act dictates that such a shareholder agreement "shalF be in 
writing. Id. at § 732 (emphasis added). 
The legislature's use of the mandatory words "shall" and "must" cannot be 
ignored. The word "shall," as used in the statute, is "usually presumed mandatory and 
has been interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions." Pugh v. Draper 
City, 114 P.3d 546, f 13 (Utah 2005). Similarly, the word "must" when used in statutes 
has been given a mandatory interpretation. Provo City v. Hanson, 601 P.2d 141, 143 
(Utah 1979). As one court noted, "where a statute uses the mandatory language 'shall/ a 
court must obey the statute and has no right to make the law contrary to what the 
legislature prescribed." Merrill v. Jansrna, 86 P.3d 270, 288 (Wyo. 2004). 
Courts strictly apply statutes that employ mandatory language. For example, in 
Pugh v. Draper, 114 P.3d 546 (Utah 2005), the court construed statutory provisions 
requiring candidates for municipal elections to file financial disclosures. The statutory 
provisions construed by the court required that city recorders "shall" remove from ballots 
the names of candidates that failed to file the appropriate disclosures. Noting the 
legislature's use of the mandatory word "shall," the court upheld the city recorders' 
actions in removing the candidate's name from the ballot due to failure to comply with 
the statutory requirement. Id. atff 12-13. 
Courts have applied a similar method of strict construction in the context of 
corporate statutes and contracts. In Farr v. Brikerhoff, 829 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), the court considered statutory provisions governing the sale of corporate assets. 
The relevant statutory provisions required that before completing a sale of substantially 
all of a corporation's assets, 1) the board "shall" adopt a resolution recommending the 
sale; 2) written notice "shall" be given to shareholders; and 3) a majority of the 
shareholders "shall" vote in favor of the sale. Id. p. 121. The court of appeals concluded 
that a purported sale of corporate assets was invalid because it failed to comply with the 
statute. 
In short, mandatory statutory language is ordinarily strictly applied and usually 
requires the invalidation of actions or contracts that are inconsistent with the statute. See 
Patterson v. Alpine City, 663 P.2d 95, 96 (Utah 1983) (municipal sewer connection fee' 
invalid because statutory requirement that "all resolutions shall be in writing is 
mandatory") (emphasis in original); Davis v. Heath Development Co., 558 P.2d 594, 596 
(Utah 1976) (corporate contract that was not approved as required by statute was invalid); 
Parr v. Stubbs, 117 P.3d 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (ordering dismissal of lien 
nullification proceeding because of plaintiffs failure to comply with mandatory 
requirements of statute). 
The Estate misses the mark when it argues that § 732 merely validates written 
shareholder agreements but does not invalidate oral shareholder agreements. The Estate 
concedes, as it must, that the alleged shareholder agreement does not comply with the 
various statutory provisions that outline how corporations are governed. At pages 18 and 
19 of its opening brief, the Estate asserts that the shareholder agreements "conflict with a 
number of the sections of the Revised Act." As noted above, the alleged agreement 
providing that Gary and Dale, as shareholders, would manage the corporations is not 
consistent with the statutory mandate that corporations "must" have a board of directors 
and "shall" be managed by the board. The legislature chose to carve out an exception 
through § 732 whereby shareholders could agree to alternative management structures. 
However, without the exception in § 732, any shareholder agreement, whether written or 
oral, providing for a form of corporate governance that is contrary to the Corporation Act 
would be suspect and subject to challenge. Clearly, the legislature intended that 
shareholder agreements with alternative management arrangements would only be valid 
if they comply with § 732. Absent an agreement that conforms to § 732, a corporation 
has no choice but to comply with the mandate that it "must" have a board of directors and 
the board "shall" manage the company. Any such agreement purporting to establish a 
management structure contrary to the Corporation Act is presumptively invalid, and must 
look to § 732 for validation. 
The trial court's interpretation of § 732 is consistent with well-established 
principles of statutory construction. This Court has endorsed, as an aid to statutory 
interpretation, the principle of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Monson v. Carver, 
928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). This phrase means "the expression of one thing is the 
exclusion of another." Id. at 1025 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th Ed. 
1990)). This Court has stated that this principle will apply if "in the natural association 
of ideas the contrast between a specific subject matter which is expressed and one which 
is not mentioned leads to an inference that the latter was not intended to be included 
within the statute." Id. (quoting Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 
1993)). Applying this principle, courts have held that "if a statute specifies under what 
conditions it is effective, we can ordinarily infer that it excludes all others." Pam 
Transport v. Freightliner Corp., 893 P.2d 1295 (Ariz. 1995). See also Rectenwald v. 
Snider, 894 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Ore. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied 907 P.2d 247 ("When a 
statute limits something to be done in a particular form, it necessarily implies in itself a 
negative, i.e., that the thing shall not be done otherwise.") 
In the present case, the legislature expressly mandates a form for corporate 
governance that requires that a board of directors manage corporations. The legislature 
has also provided for an exception to the ordinary manner of corporate governance only 
through an agreement that complies with § 732. Section 732 dictates that such an 
agreement "shall" be in writing. By expressly outlining a form for corporate governance 
and a specific process for deviating from that form, the legislature quite clearly excluded 
the validity of agreements that fail to comply with § 732. 
The Corporate Defendants' interpretation of § 732 is consistent with the 
interpretation given a similar statute by the Maine Supreme Court in Villar v. Kernan, 
695 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1997). In Villar, the court held that an oral shareholder agreement 
was invalid, noting that the agreement "must meet the [statute's] specifications and 
therefore must be in writing to be enforceable." Id. at 1224. 
In construing statutes, courts have a "duty to avoid interpreting a statute in a 
manner that renders portions of the statute, or related statutes, meaningless." Lyon v. 
Burton, 5 P.3d 616, ^ 19 n. 5 (Utah 1996). In the present case, the legislature has 
mandated a form of corporate governance, subject only to the exception found in § 732. 
Section 732 mandates that any shareholder agreement changing the form of corporate 
governance "shall" be in writing. If the court were to adopt the Estate's interpretation of 
§ 732, the statutory requirement for written shareholder agreements would be 
meaningless. If the Estate's position were to be adopted, an oral agreement would be just 
as valid as a written agreement, and the requirement in § 732(2) for a written document 
would be pointless. 
3. The Court Should Not by Judicial Decision Create an Equitable Exception to 
§ 732's Mandatory Requirements. 
The Estate appears also to argue that the Court should overlook the mandatory 
language of § 732 because the alleged shareholder agreement was partly performed, and 
it would be inequitable not to enforce the agreement. This assertion has no factual basis 
in the allegations of the Complaint. At issue is the right of Gary's heirs to participate in 
management. The Complaint does not even allege that Dale and Gary reached an 
agreement whereby their heirs would manage the companies after either's death. 
Similarly, the Complaint doesn't allege that such an agreement was partly reformed. 
In any event, § 732 does not include a part performance exception. Obviously, the 
legislature knows how to create a part performance exception because it has done so in 
the Statute of Frauds. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-8 (remedy of specific performance is 
available with respect to an agreement otherwise barred by the statute of frauds if the 
agreement was partly performed). 
The Court should not by judicial action effectively amend the statute to include a 
part performance exception because courts lack power to ignore mandatory statutory 
requirements based upon equitable considerations. Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 670 
(Utah 1992) (court "does not have the authority to ignore existing principles of law in 
favor of its view of the equities."); see also Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649, 650 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987), aff d 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988) (mandatory requirement for interest on 
judgment could not be ignored on equitable grounds because "when principles of equity 
confront rules of law, 'equity follows the law.'") (quoting McDermott v. McDermott, 628 
P.2d 959, 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). 
4. The Official Commentary to § 732 Need Not Be Considered Because the Statute is 
Unambiguous, but Even if Considered, it Supports the Trial Court's Dismissal of 
the Complaint. 
The Estate argues that § 732 is ambiguous and the Court should look to the official 
commentary in order to construe the statute. This argument is in error, as set forth above. 
Accordingly, the Court should apply the plain language of the statute and it is 
unnecessary for the Court to even consider the official commentary. In any event, even if 
considered, neither the official commentary nor policy considerations support the Estate's 
interpretation of the statute. 
Section 732(1) outlines, by illustration, the subject matter of potential agreements 
that § 732 validates. Section 732(2) then outlines the formal requirements for such an 
agreement. The official commentary, in discussing § 732(1), states that the definition of 
potential subjects for agreements, as outlined in Subsection 1, is illustrative only, and not 
exclusive, stating: 
Section 732(1) defines the range of permissible subject matter for 
shareholder agreements largely by illustration, enumerating seven types of 
agreements that are expressly validated to the extent they would not be 
valid absent section 732. The enumeration of these types of agreements is 
not exclusive; nor should it give rise to a negative inference that an 
agreement of a type that is or might be embraced by one of the categories of 
subsection 732(1) is, ipso facto, a type of agreement that is not valid unless 
it complies with Section 732. Section 732(1) also contains a "catch-all" 
which adds a measure of flexibility to the seven enumerated categories. 
(Official Commentary, p. 338, attached as Addendum 4). The Estate reads the above-
referenced portion of the commentary to mean that an agreement is not necessarily 
invalid because of failure to comply with the requirements of § 732(2), including the 
requirement that an agreement be in writing. However, there is no reference to the 
specific requirements of Subsection 2 in this portion of the commentary. This portion of 
the commentary does not at all state that oral agreements are valid under § 732. Rather, 
this section of the commentary only states that the permissible range of subjects as 
outlined in § 732(1) is not exclusive, and other kinds of agreements not expressly 
described in § 732(1) may also be validated by the statute, even though not specifically 
referenced in subsection one. In short, this portion of the commentary only addresses the 
potential subjects which a shareholder agreement may address. It does not address the 
formal requirements for a shareholder agreement as outlined in subsection two or the 
result of failure to comply with those requirements. 
The Estate's argument is also inconsistent with other portions of the official 
commentary. The official commentary provides that § 732 "adds an important element of 
predictability previously absent from the Model Act and affords participants in closely 
held corporations greater contractual freedom to tailor the rules of their enterprise." Id. at 
p. 338. The commentary further states that its purpose is to add "legal certainty" to 
certain types of shareholder agreements. Id. The official commentary further provides 
that the section "minimizes the formal requirements for a shareholder agreement" and 
states that "the principal requirements are simply that the agreement be in writing and be 
approved or agreed to by all persons who are shareholders." Id. at p. 339. The 
commentary notes that a written agreement signed by all shareholders is desirable, even if 
the agreement is contained in the company's bylaws, because it would "establish 
unequivocally" the agreement. Id. 
It is apparent from the commentary that the purpose of § 732 is twofold: (1) to 
allow shareholders in closely held corporations greater contractual freedom as to how 
their enterprise will be governed; and (2) to increase predictability and legal certainty 
concerning shareholder relationships and the governance of closely held corporations. To 
carry out these purposes, the official commentary states that § 732 includes minimal 
formal requirements, but those formal requirements do include that the agreement be in 
writing. 
The Estate's construction of § 732 is contrary to the statute's stated purpose of 
obtaining predictability and legal certainty through a written agreement approved by all 
shareholders. Contrary to the intent of the statute as outlined in the commentary, the 
Estate would have the trial court examine years of interaction between the shareholders in 
an attempt to infer a shareholders agreement based upon "custom, usage, and course of 
dealing." (Complaint, f 27, ROA p. 7.) Resolving the issues raised in the complaint 
under the standard urged by the Estate will require extended, complicated legal 
proceedings. 
If the Estate were successful in obtaining the relief it requests in the complaint, the 
confusion and uncertainty would increase. Even as alleged by the Estate in the 
complaint, the terms of the alleged shareholder agreement are indefinite and unwieldy. 
This is plainly evident from the relief requested. In the complaint, the Estate requests an 
order requiring that "Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns . . . be involved in the 
formulation and implementation of policies for the conducting of the business of [the 
companies]" and further requiring that the companies "neither adopt or implement 
policies or conduct business of the companies to which Plaintiff or his successors and 
assigns are not in agreement." (Id. f 59(a), ROA pp. 18-19.) In short, the Estate 
requests that Dale and the heirs of Gary become involuntary partners in the management 
of the businesses. This will result in a morass of confusion and contention concerning 
what business decisions require the Estate's consent. 
The result urged by the Estate is very different from the predictable written 
agreement contemplated by § 732, and is contrary to the goal of "legal certainty" 
envisioned by the commentary. 
B. UTAH CODE ANN, § 16-10a-732 REQUIRES THAT A SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT 
PROVIDING FOR MANAGEMENT OF A CORPORATION IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE CORPORATION ACT EXPIRES AFTER TEN YEARS WHEN THE TERM 
AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES IN THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT IS INDEFINITE, 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that even if there were an 
enforceable shareholders agreement along the lines argued by the Estate, it could not 
endure beyond ten years pursuant to § 732(2). Section 732(2) provides that shareholder 
agreements are "valid for ten years, unless the agreement provides otherwise." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732(2)(c). The Estate argues that this provision has no application, 
asserting that 
there was no factual basis from which the trial court could properly 
conclude that Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler had not agreed that the terms of 
their agreements would extend for so long as each owned 50% of the 
capital shares of the companies, both intending and understanding that term 
may extend in excess often years. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 24.) The Estate, however, can cite no allegation in the Complaint 
which alleges that Gary and Dale Ostler agreed that the alleged shareholder agreement 
would extend beyond ten years. Rather, the allegations in the Complaint, at best, allege 
an agreement with an undefined term. The Estate appears to argue that the ten year 
default term in § 732 does not apply because Gary and Dale agreed that the term of their 
agreement would extend indefinitely. In other words, the Estate argues that § 732's 
condition of "unless the agreement provides otherwise" is satisfied because Gary and 
Dale's agreement allegedly included an indefinite term. This interpretation of the statute 
is contrary to its clear language. 
Section 732 contemplates that shareholders (in a written agreement) may define 
the duration of their agreement. In the event the shareholders do not do so, § 732 
imposes by default a term often years. Since, as the Estate concedes, Gary and Dale did 
not define the duration of the agreement, § 732's default term applies. 
The Estate attempts to turn the agreement into a perpetual, unending agreement 
because Gary and Dale did not define a specific term for the alleged agreement. 
However, that is not how the law treats agreements for which the parties do not define a 
term. Contracts that do not specify a duration are "generally presumed to be terminable 
at will." Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54 P.3d 1165, ^ 21 (Utah 2002); see 
also Midwest Energy Consultants v. Covenant Home, 815 N.E.2d 911,915 (111. Ct. App. 
2004) (consulting agreement of indefinite duration terminable at will); Santa Fe Custom 
Shutters and Doorss Inc. v. Home^Depot USA, 113 P.3d 347, 358 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005), 
cert, denied 113 P.3d 345 (N.M. 2005) (holding under UCC that contract of indefinite 
duration is terminable at will).4 If the statutory term of ten years does not apply, either 
Gary or Dale would be free to terminate the agreement at any time. If the agreement 
were transferable, then successors to Gary and Dale would have the same right. 
C. AN ALLEGED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF 
A CORPORATION IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE CORPORATION ACT IS 
NOT INHERITABLE WHEN THE AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE A PERSONAL 
RELATIONSHIP AMONG SHAREHOLDERS IN MANAGING THE CORPORATION, 
INCLUDING ESTABLISHING AND IMPLEMENTING ALL COMPANY POLICIES AND 
PROGRAMS, DEVELOPING BUSINESS VENTURES, AND MAKING DECISIONS 
CONCERNING THE USE OF PROFITS. 
The Complaint assumes, as a matter of law, that the Estate, as the successor in 
interest to Gary's stock, is entitled to enforce the alleged shareholder agreement. The 
Complaint does not allege that Gary and Dale agreed that after their death their heirs 
would be subject to the same agreement. Rather, the Complaint presumes that the 
shareholder agreement is inheritable as a matter of law. This assumption, however, is in 
error. 
It is well established that not every right is assignable or inheritable. 
[R]ights or interests which are personal to the deceased are not inheritable 
and ordinarily are not subject to descent and distribution. Such rights 
include a personal right to use land, a personal power of appointment, 
personal option, a statutory right to contest a will, a grantor's right to take 
advantage of the breach of a condition subsequent in a deed, a tenancy at 
will, or an estate for life. 
26B CJS Descent and Distribution § 9 (2001). The Estate can cite no case law providing 
that the authority and fiduciary duty ordinarily conferred upon directors to manage 
4
 Although not controlling, the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is persuasive by analogy. 
It provides "where the contract provides for successive performances but is indefinite in 
corporations may be assigned or inherited. Indeed, the fiduciary duties imposed upon 
directors are "non-delegable." Auerbach v Bennett, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (N.Y. 1979). 
Utah law recognizes that not all rights are assignable or inheritable. For example, 
this Court has held that a professional degree is "highly personal" and "terminates on 
death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, or 
conveyed, or pledged." Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1991) (quoting In 
re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Utah 1978)). Utah case law has found that in 
some circumstances the rights created by contract are personal in nature and cannot be 
transferred. For example, in Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, 436 P.2d 
230 (Utah 1968), the court held that a contract which granted hunting privileges to 
designated individuals was limited to the specified individuals and could not be assigned 
or inherited. 
Contracts are not assignable when "they involve a matter of personal trust or 
confidence or are for personal services." Scott v. Fix Brothers Enterprises, Inc., 667 P.2d 
773 (Col. Ct. App. 1983). Utah law has followed this principle, holding that "a contract 
which is personal in nature, where the personal needs, characteristics or personality of the 
obligee are dominant factors in the reason for contracting, is not assignable." Clark v. 
Shelton, 584 P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1978). 
It is apparent from the face of the Complaint that the contract alleged by the 
Estate, if it existed, was highly personal in nature, and not assignable. Gary and Dale 
duration it is valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at 
any time by either party." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-309. 
were brothers. They each were shareholders in the companies and, according to the 
Complaint, agreed to operate the companies informally as partners, with neither business 
doing anything without the consent of both Gary and Dale. This quite obviously was a 
relationship of personal trust and confidence, where the personal traits and characteristics 
of each were dominant factors in the relationship. The right to manage the corporations 
ought not to transfer to their heirs as a matter of law. 
Closely-held corporations sometimes operate more like a partnership, without 
compliance with all of the formalities that usually apply to corporations. See Roos v. 
Aloi, 487 N.Y.S. 2d 637, 640 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1985) (in the case of closely held 
corporations, "certain formalities may be waived" and the court may "treat the 
shareholders as copartners"). The purpose of § 732 is to provide a mechanism whereby 
shareholders of a closely-held corporation can adapt the enterprise to meet their needs, 
without complying with the management structure ordinarily applicable to corporations. 
Section 732(6) expressly authorizes a shareholder agreement that "treats a corporation as 
if it were a partnership." UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732(6). Given the nature of 
closely-held corporations, Utah partnership law, although not controlling, is persuasive 
by analogy with respect to the issue of whether management rights can be assigned and 
inherited. 
Utah statutory provisions provide that a partner may assign his interest in a 
partnership unless an agreement provides otherwise, and the assignment permits the 
assignee to receive the partnership profits to which the assigning partner would be 
entitled. However, the Act further specifies that the assignment does not "entitle the 
assignee during the continuance of the partnership to interfere in the management or 
administration of the partnership business or affairs." UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-24. The 
Act further provides that an assignment of a partnership interest merely allows the 
assignee to receive profits to which the assigning partner otherwise would have been 
entitled. Id. Furthermore, Utah partnership law provides that upon the death of a partner, 
the heirs of the deceased partner do not step into the shoes of the deceased to continue 
operating the business. Rather, the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the 
partnership. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-28(4). Utah partnership law adopts the common 
sense notion that the personal relationships inherently required in the management of a 
business should not be involuntarily imposed upon anyone. 
The position urged by the Estate would lead to an absurd, impracticable result. If 
the position urged by the Estate is accepted, it would mean that the heirs of Gary and 
Dale, as owners of the stock, are forever bound by an agreement that requires a personal 
relationship among them in the management of the companies. If the Estate's position is 
adopted, this agreement of indefinite duration could never be terminated, and Gary's and 
Dale's heirs would forever be involuntarily compelled to act as partners in managing the 
companies. Not only does the law not require this result, it is difficult to imagine that 
either Gary or Dale contemplated such an arrangement. Indeed, the Complaint fails even 
to allege that Gary and Dale contemplated that the shareholder agreement described in 
the complaint would extend beyond the death of either. Stability and competent 
management is necessary for the continued success of any company. The Estate's 
position could place these important goals in jeopardy, and will undoubtedly result in 
contention and uncertainty in the companies' management structure. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE ESTATE'S CLAIMS BECAUSE THE 
ESTATE CONCEDES THAT ALL CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARE BARRED BY UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1) AND THE EQUITABLE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
IS NOT AVAILABLE TO COMPEL PARTIES TO ENGAGE IN A PERSONAL 
RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST IN MANAGING AND OPERATING A BUSINESS. 
In the trial court, the Estate conceded that any claim it may have asserted for 
damages is barred by the statute of frauds as set out in UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1). 
This statutory provision provides that an agreement not to be performed within one year 
is void unless it is in writing. In the trial court, the Estate conceded the applicability of § 
25-5-4(1), stating "the agreements do fall within the purview of Section 25-5-4(1)." 
(Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the Ostler International and Ostler Property 
Development Motion to Dismiss, p. 14, ROA p. 157). The Estate has argued, however, 
that to the extent its claims seek specific performance of the shareholder agreement, the 
claims survive because the agreement was partly performed. The Estate relied upon 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-8 to make this argument, which states: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers 
of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part 
performance thereof. 
This argument fails because, as noted above, the legislature did not include a part 
performance exception to the mandatory requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-
732(2). In addition, this argument fails because courts will not specifically enforce 
agreements involving personal relationships. 
It should first be noted that the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs claims to 
the extent they seek to recover damages. The saving clause found in § 25-5-8 only 
preserves claims for specific performance based upon the part performance doctrine. The 
Estate makes no argument that any claim for damages somehow survives, and there is no 
legal authority to support such a position. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed 
all of Plaintiff s claims to the extent the claims seek to recover damages. 
In addition, the Estate's claims fail because it is clear from the face of the 
Complaint that specific performance is not possible as a remedy in this case. The Estate 
seeks a court order that would require that Gary's heirs and Dale Ostler work together as 
partners in managing the business of the Corporate Defendamts. The Estate seeks an 
order requiring that the Estate's consent is necessary before the Corporate Defendants can 
implement any business policy or practice and that the Estate must be permitted to 
participate in the management of the business. The order which the Estate seeks extends 
far beyond the Estate and Dale Ostler. The Estate apparently would have this Court order 
that the heirs or successors to Dale and Gary are perpetually bound by the alleged verbal 
agreement that the owners of the stock would operate the businesses as partners, with no 
major decisions being made without the consent of all the stockholders. In short, the 
Estate seeks an order compelling personal relationships among both present and future 
shareholders, as well as an order compelling those shareholders to render personal 
services to the companies pursuant to an alleged verbal agreement between Dale and 
Gary. Courts, however, cannot properly order parties to work together in such a fashion, 
nor should any court enter such any order that undoubtedly would require ongoing 
judicial intervention and supervision of these companies' business practices for years to 
come. 
The restatement provides as follows: 
(1) A promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced. 
(2) A promise to render personal service exclusively for one employer will 
not be enforced by an injunction against serving another if its probable 
result will be to compel a performance involving personal relations the 
enforced continuance of which is undesirable.... 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1979). Following this principle, courts 
have declined to order specific performance of partnership agreements, even if there is a 
breach of the agreement. 
[t]he relationship of partners is one of agency. It is so personal in nature 
that equity will not enforce the continuation of a partnership when one 
partner elects to terminate it, even though termination would be contrary to 
the partnership agreement. 
Logan v. Logan, 675 P.2d 1242, 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
Courts also decline to enter orders of specific performance when to do so would 
impose a difficult burden of ongoing supervision on the court. The restatement provides 
as follows: 
A promise will not be specifically enforced if the character and magnitude 
of the performance would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or 
supervision that are disproportionate to the advantages to be gained from 
enforcement and to the harm to be suffered from its denial. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 366 (1979). Following this principle, courts 
have concluded that "[n]o affirmative equitable relief is better than problematic equitable 
relief," and "[e]quitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, 
and what is workable." Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 
2d 1047, 1160 (D. Neb. 2002) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973)), 
aff d 358 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2004). 
If the Court were to grant an order of specific performance along the lines 
requested by Plaintiff, the Court would bear the burden of continued supervision and 
interpretation concerning the relationship of reluctant, unwilling partners in a partnership 
that will have no end. It is simply not fair to coerce the parties into a relationship of such 
personal trust. Undoubtedly any order compelling an ongoing partnership will lead to 
further disputes and continued resort to court intervention. This is an inappropriate 
burden to place on the trial court and it is not fair to the parties. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal 
of the complaint. 
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16-10a-728. Voting for directors - Cumulative voting. 
(1) At each election of directors, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or 
this chapter, every shareholder entitled to vote at the election has the right to cast, in person or by 
proxy, all of the votes to which the shareholder's shares are entitled for as many persons as there 
are directors to be elected and for whose election the shareholder has the right to vote. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or this chapter, directors are 
elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election, at a meeting 
of shareholders at which a quorum is present. 
(3) Shareholders do not have a right to cumulate their votes for the election of directors 
unless the articles of incorporation so provide. 
(4) A statement included in the articles of incorporation to the effect that all or a designated 
voting group of shareholders are entitled to cumulate their votes for directors, means that the 
shareholders designated are entitled to multiply the number of votes they are entitled to cast by 
the number of directors for whom they are entitled to vote and cast the product for a single 
candidate or distribute the product among two or more candidates. 
(5) Shares entitled to vote cumulatively may be voted cumulatively at each election of 
directors unless the articles of incorporation provide alternative procedures for the exercise of the 
cumulative voting rights. 
History: C. 1953,16-10a-728, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 75. 
16-10a-732. Shareholder agreements. 
(1) An agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that complies with this section is 
effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is inconsistent with one or 
more other provisions of this chapter in that it: 
(a) eliminates the board of directors or restricts the discretion or powers of the board of 
directors; 
(b) governs the authorization or making of distributions whether or not in proportion to 
ownership of shares, subject to the limitations in Section 16-10a-640; 
(c) establishes who shall be directors or officers of the corporation, or their terms of office or 
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manner of selection or removal; 
(d) governs, in general or in regard to specific matters, the exercise or division of voting 
power by or between the shareholders and directors or by or among any of them, including use of 
weighted voting rights or director proxies; 
(e) establishes the terms and conditions of any agreement for the transfer or use of property or 
the provision of services between the corporation and any shareholder, director, officer or 
employee of the corporation or among any of them; 
(f) transfers to one or more shareholders or other persons all or part of the authority to 
exercise the corporate powers or to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, including 
the resolution of any issue about which there exists a deadlock among directors or shareholders; 
(g) requires dissolution of the corporation at the request of one or more of the shareholders or 
upon the occurrence of a specified event or contingency; or 
(h) otherwise governs the exercise of the corporate powers or the management of the business 
and affairs of the corporation or the relationship among the shareholders, the directors and the 
corporation, or among any of them, and is not contrary to public policy. 
(2) An agreement authorized by this section shall be: 
(a) set forth: 
(i) in the articles of incorporation or bylaws and approved by all persons who are 
shareholders at the time of the agreement; or 
(ii) in a written agreement that is signed by all persons who are shareholders at the time of the 
agreement and is made known to the corporation; 
(b) subject to amendment only by all persons who are shareholders at the time of the 
amendment, unless the agreement provides otherwise; and 
(c) valid for 10 years, unless the agreement provides otherwise. 
(3) The existence of an agreement authorized by this section shall be noted conspicuously on 
the front or back of each certificate for outstanding shares or on the information statement 
required by Section 16-10a-626(2). If at the time of the agreement the corporation has shares 
outstanding represented by certificates, the corporation shall recall the outstanding certificates 
and issue substitute certificates that comply with this subsection. The failure to note the existence 
of the agreement on the certificate or information statement does not affect the validity of the 
agreement or any action taken pursuant to it. Any purchaser of shares who, at the time of 
purchase, did not have knowledge of the existence of the agreement is entitled to rescission of the 
purchase. A purchaser is considered to have knowledge of the existence of the agreement if its 
existence is noted on the certificate or information statement for the shares in compliance with 
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this subsection and, if the shares are not represented by a certificate, the information statement is 
delivered to the purchaser at or prior to the time of purchase of the shares. An action to enforce 
the right of rescission authorized by this subsection must be commenced within the earlier of 
ninety days after discovery of the existence of the agreement or two years after the time of 
purchase of the shares. 
(4) An agreement authorized by this section shall cease to be effective when shares of the 
corporation are listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained 
by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities association. If the agreement ceases 
to be effective for any reason, the board of directors may, if the agreement is contained or 
referred to in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws, adopt an amendment to the 
articles of incorporation or bylaws, without shareholder action, to delete the agreement and any 
references to it. 
(5) An agreement authorized by this section that limits the discretion or powers of the board 
of directors shall relieve the directors of, and impose upon the person or persons in whom the 
discretion or powers are vested, liability for acts or omissions imposed by laws on directors to the 
extent that the discretion or powers of the directors are limited by the agreement. 
(6) The existence or performance of an agreement authorized by this section may not be a 
ground for imposing personal liability on any shareholder for the acts or debts of the corporation 
even if the agreement or its performance treats the corporation as if it were a partnership or 
results in failure to observe the corporate formalities otherwise applicable to the matters 
governed by the agreement. 
(7) Incorporators or subscribers for shares may act as shareholders with respect to an 
agreement authorized by this section if no shares have been issued when the agreement is made. 
History: C. 1953,16-10a-732, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 78. 
16-10a-801. Requirement for and duties of board of directors. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 16-10a-732, each corporation must have a board of 
directors. 
(2) All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and 
affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any 
limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under Section 
16-10a-732. 
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History: C. 1953,16-10a-801, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 80. 
16-10a-805. Terms of directors generally. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 16-10a-806, the terms of the initial directors of a 
corporation expire at the first shareholders' meeting at which directors are elected. 
(2) Except as provided in Section 16-i0a-806, the terms of all other directors expire at the 
next annual shareholders' meeting following their election. 
(3) A decrease in the number of directors does not shorten an incumbent director's term. 
(4) (a) A director elected to fill a vacancy created other than by an increase in the number of 
directors shall be elected for the unexpired term of the director's predecessor in office, or for any 
lesser period as may be prescribed by the board of directors. 
(b) If a director is elected to fill a vacancy created by reason of an increase in the number of 
directors, then the term of the director so elected expires at the next shareholders' meeting at 
which directors are elected, unless the vacancy is filled by a vote of the shareholders, in which 
case the term shall expire on the later of: 
(i) the next meeting of shareholders at which directors are elected; or 
(ii) the term designated for the director at the time of the creation of the position being filled. 
(5) Despite the expiration of a director's term, the director continues to serve until the 
election and qualification of a successor or until there is a decrease in the number of directors. 
(6) A director whose term has ended may deliver to the division for filing a statement to that 
effect pursuant to Section 16-10a-1608. 
History: C. 1953,16-10a-805, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 84. 
16-10a-810. Vacancy on board. 
(1) Unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, if a vacancy occurs on a board of 
directors, including a vacancy resulting from an increase in the number of directors: 
(a) the shareholders may fill the vacancy; 
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(b) the board of directors may fill the vacancy; or 
(c) if the directors remaining in office constitute fewer than a quorum of the board, they may 
fill the vacancy by the affirmative vote of a majority of all the directors remaining in office. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, if the vacant office was held or 
is to be held by a director elected by a voting group of shareholders: 
(a) if one or more of the other directors elected by the same voting group are serving, only 
they are entitled to vote to fill the vacancy if it is filled by the directors; and 
(b) only the holders of shares of that voting group are entitled to vote to fill the vacancy if it 
is filled by the shareholders. 
(3) A vacancy that will occur at a specific later date, by reason of a resignation effective at a 
later date under Section 16-10a-807 or otherwise, may be filled before the vacancy occurs, but 
the new director may not take office until the vacancy occurs. 
History: C. 1953,16-10a-810, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 89; 1993, ch. 184, § 2. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum 
of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making 
of the agreement; 
(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another; 
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except 
mutual promises to marry; 
(d) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in damages for the 
liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own estate; 
(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real 
estate for compensation; and 
(f) every credit agreement. 
(2) (a) As used in Subsection (l)(f) and this Subsection (2): 
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(i) (A) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by a financial institution to: 
(I) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or things in action; 
(II) otherwise extend credit; or 
(III) make any other financial accommodation. 
(B) "Credit agreement" does not include the usual and customary agreements related to 
deposit accounts or overdrafts or other terms associated with deposit accounts or overdrafts. 
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution which extends credit or extends a financial 
accommodation under a credit agreement with a debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial 
accommodation, under a credit agreement with a financial institution. 
(iv) "Financial institution" means: 
(A) a state or federally chartered: 
(I) bank; 
(II) savings and loan association; 
(III) savings bank; 
(IV) industrial bank; or 
(V) credit union; or 
(B) any other institution under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial Institutions 
as provided in Title 7, Financial Institutions Act. 
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(e)5 a debtor or a creditor may not maintain an 
action on a credit agreement unless the agreement: 
(A) is in writing; 
(B) expresses consideration; 
(C) sets forth the relevant terms and conditions; and 
(D) is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the agi cement would be sought. 
(ii) For purposes of this act, a signed application constituies a signed agreement, if the 
creditor does not customarily obtain an additional signed agreement from the debtor when 
granting the application. 
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(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a credit agreement is created, unless 
the agreement satisfies the requirements of Subsection (2)(b): 
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor; 
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or 
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a creditor and a debtor of fiduciary or other 
business relationships. 
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly stated typewritten or printed provision 
giving notice to the debtor that the written agreement is a final expression of the agreement 
between the creditor and debtor and the written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence 
of any alleged oral agreement. The provision does not have to be on the promissory note or other 
evidence of indebtedness that is tied to the credit agreement. 
(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature by the party to be 
charged if: 
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the terms of the agreement; 
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the credit offered shall constitute acceptance of 
those terms; and 
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor, or a person authorized by the debtor, 
requests funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise uses the credit offered. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2467; L. 1909, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5817; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 33-5-4; L. 1989, ch. 257, § 1; 1996, ch. 182, § 24; 2004, ch. 92, § 24. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to 
compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2477; C.L. 1917, § 5824; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,33-5-8. 
48-1-24. Assignment of partner's interest. 
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A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not of itself dissolve the 
partnership, or, as against the other partners in the absence of agreement, entitle the assignee 
during the continuance of the partnership to interfere in the management or administration of the 
partnership business or affairs, or to require any information or account of partnership 
transactions, or to inspect the partnership books; but it merely entitles the assignee to receive in 
accordance with his contract the profits to which the assigning partner would otherwise be 
entitled. 
In case of a dissolution of a partnership, the assignee is entitled to receive his assignor's 
interest, and may require an account from the date only of the last account agreed to by all the 
partners. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 27; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-24. 
48-1-28. Causes of dissolution. 
Dissolution is caused: 
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners: 
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking specified in the 
agreement. 
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking is 
specified. 
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned their interests, or suffered 
them to be charged for their separate debts, either before or after the termination of any specified 
term or particular undertaking. 
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a 
power conferred by the agreement between the partners. 
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do not 
permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the express will of any partner 
at any time. 
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the partnership to be carried on 
or for the members to carry it on in partnership. 
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(4) By the death of any partner. 
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership. 
(6) By decree of court under Section 48-1-29. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 31; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-28. 
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RULING AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 040926555 
June 8, 2005 
The above matter came before the Court on June 6, 2005 for 
oral argument on Defendants' motions to dismiss, Plaintiff's Motion 
to Postpone Decision, and the Ostler Defendants' Motion to Strike, 
pursuant to Rule 7. Plaintiff was present through Gary A. Weston, 
the Ostlers were present through Mark A. Larsen, and Ostler 
International and Ostler Property Development ("the corporations") 
were present through Steven G. Loosle. 
The corporations' Motion to Dismiss, with accompanying 
memorandum, was filed on January 20, 2005. On January 24, 2005, 
the Ostlers filed their Motion to Dismiss with an accompanying 
memorandum and an affidavit. Plaintiff filed his opposition to the 
corporations' motion on February 15, 2005, and independently filed 
his opposition to the Ostlers' motion on February 22, 2005. On the 
same date, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Postpone Decision on the 
Ostler Motion to Dismiss, with accompanying affidavit. The Ostlers 
filed their reply in support of their motion to dismiss on February 
28, 2005. On March 3, 2005, the Ostlers filed both their 
opposition to Plaintiff's motion to postpone and their motion to 
strike, with accompanying memorandum, and the corporations' reply 
in support of their motion was also filed on March 3, 2005. 
Plaintiff's reply in support of his motion to postpone was filed on 
March 10, 2005 and his opposition to the Ostlers' motion to strike 
followed on March 17, 2005. The Ostlers filed their reply in 
support of their motion to strike on March 24, 2005. These motions 
were submitted for decision on March 29, 2005. 
The court scheduled and heard oral argument and took the matter 
under advisement. Having considered the case file, the motion and 
the memoranda submitted by the parties, and the arguments made in 
open court, the Court enters the following decision. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Douglas Stowell is the Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Gary W. Ostler, who, at the time of his death in July 
2003, was 50% shareholder in Defendants Ostler International Inc., 
and Ostler Property Development, Inc., both of which are closely 
held corporations. At the time Gary Ostler died his brother 
Defendant Dale Ostler held the other 50% of the shares in both 
corporations. Both brothers, without the benefit of bylaws or any 
provisions in the articles of incorporation, and apparently by oral 
-2-
agreement, served as the board of directors and shared equal 
decision-making authority for both companies. Shortly after Gary's 
death, Dale Ostler appointed himself and another brother, Defendant 
Vyron Ostler, as the new Board of Directors in both companies. 
Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of the Estate of Gary 
Ostler to seek to require the parties to continue to operate under 
the oral agreement under which the parties operated prior to Gary's 
death, and specifically to require and enjoin Defendants from 
taking any action without the consent of Plaintiff, including, but 
not limited to, appointing a new board of directors. 
DISCUSSION 
Treatment of Ostlers' Motion as Motion for Summary Judgment 
The crux of the arguments in favor of dismissal of this action 
lies in the simple proposition that because the alleged agreement 
between Gary and Dale Ostler was not in writing, it cannot be 
enforced. The affidavit of Dale Ostler, while it may be useful for 
determining what the terms of such agreement were, is not helpful 
in determining the legal question of whether any such oral 
agreement can be enforced under either the Utah Revised Business 
Corporations Act, or under its predecessor, the Utah Business 
Corporations Act. 
In the court's view, this is a purely legal consideration, and 
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the facts upon which such a legal determination may be made are 
contained entirely in the Complaint filed in this matter. 
Accordingly, because the court does not rely upon the Affidavit of 
Dale Ostler in reaching its decision, the court hereby excludes 
such, and determines this matter under Rule 12(b)(6) as the 
substantive motions filed herein invite. 
Consequently, Plaintiff's motion to postpone and the Ostlers' 
motion to strike, inasmuch as these motions were relevant only if 
the Ostler Motion was considered as a motion filed under Rule 56, 
are hereby DENIED as moot. 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
Because the court considers the present motions as they were 
presented, and excludes all matters outside the pleading, it is 
appropriate that the court consider the facts as alleged to be 
true, indulging all reasonable inferences consistent with the 
allegations of the complaint. 
Enforceability of the Oral Agreement 
Plaintiff's nine causes of action seek enforcement of the oral 
agreement under contract and equitable theories, and those theories 
include breach of contract (first and second causes of action), 
constructive trust (third), unjust enrichment (fourth), breach of 
fiduciary duty (fifth), promissory estoppel (sixth). The complaint 
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also seek declaratory and injunctive relief and an accounting 
(seventh-ninth causes of action) . At the heart of all of these 
causes of action are duties which arose as a result of an oral 
agreement between Dale Ostler and Gary Ostler. While the court 
assumes the existence of an agreement between the two brothers, the 
question arises whether the agreement is still in force, which may 
be determined upon facts as alleged in the complaint. 
Applicability of U.C.A. § 16-10A-732 
For purposes of this motion, the court accepts Plaintiff's 
argument that while there were two separate corporations formed, 
the agreement under which both corporations were managed predates 
those incorporations, and also predates the Utah Revised Business 
Corporations Act. However, the act specifically applies itself to 
those corporations which were in existence at the time it was 
enacted, as well as those formed afterward, in an attempt to ensure 
the uniform application of the law to all corporations then in 
existence. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10A-1701. Plaintiff has not 
submitted to the court any basis for application of the saving 
provisions established under § 1704, which provides a limited basis 
for the enforcement of the previous act, except for the existence 
of the agreement prior to enactment of the revised act. 
Accordingly, the court applies the provisions of the Utah Revised 
Business Corporations Act to the agreement. 
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Restriction on Operational Agreements Outside of the Act 
Section 732(2) of the act provides: 
(2) An agreement authorized by this section 
[i.e. one which takes operation of the company 
outside the act] shall be: 
(a) set forth: 
(I) in the articles of 
incorporation or bylaws and approved 
by all persons who are shareholders 
at the time of the agreement; or 
(ii) in a written agreement 
that is signed by all persons who 
are shareholders at the time of the 
agreement and is made known to the 
corporation; . . . 
©) valid for 10 years, unless the 
agreement provides otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10A-732(2). The words "shall be" constitute 
mandatory language—in other words, operation within this provision 
is limited to only those circumstances specified in the provision. 
Those circumstances are that an agreement formed which allows a 
corporation to operate outside of the requirements of the Act, 
"shall be set forth" in the articles of incorporation or bylaws, or 
in a written agreement. Under both methods, the agreement must be 
approved by all shareholders. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff's argument to the contrary 
notwithstanding, unless the agreement provides specifically for the 
agreement to endure beyond ten years, it falls within the default 
operation of subsection 2©) , which is that it "shall be . . . valid 
for 10 years." Because the corporations were formed in 1988 and 
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1993, any agreement ceased to be enforceable no later than July 
2003, which, coincidentally, was about the time of Gary's death. 
If the passage of the Act is considered as the relevant time, the 
agreement ceased to be effective in 1992. Accordingly, the 
agreement, even if it had been in writing and thus enforceable, 
would no longer have been in force after Gary's death unless it had 
provided for a period in excess of ten years. Thus, no action may 
be maintained on the contract and the Plaintiff's first and second 
causes of action must be dismissed. 
Plaintiff argues that section 732 does not label as "invalid" 
an agreement that is not in writing. The court disagrees as to the 
legal effect of the words "shall" be in writing. The court 
believes that if not in writing, an agreement meant to allow a 
diversion from the requirements of the Act must be in writing or it 
is not enforceable. 
Equitable Treatment of the Agreement 
Notwithstanding the failure of the agreement to survive until 
the present action accrued, the question remains whether the 
promises made to Gary Ostler might create an equitable obligation 
upon Dale Ostler and the corporations which inured to the benefit 
of Gary's estate. The difficulty with this is that there is no 
allegation in the complaint from which the court may conclude that 
the operation of the agreement was intended to benefit any other 
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persons than Gary and Dale Ostler. Throughout the complaint are 
statements regarding the intent of Gary and Dale Ostler on how the 
profits were to be divided and how decisions were to be made and 
how stock ownership was to be divided, but these only serve to 
underscore the assumption that those arrangements were made for the 
benefit of Gary and Dale personally. From the informality of the 
agreement it may clearly be assumed that these two individuals 
believed that they did not need to have any formal agreement or 
document detailing how to run the companies precisely because of 
the personalities involved. Dale apparently knew he could trust 
Gary, and vice versa. When Gary died, the value of such an 
informal arrangement to Dale perished with Gary. In light of these 
circumstances, it would not be equitable to tie the remaining 
member of the corporations to Gary's estate, and force him to 
conduct business as if nothing had happened, especially when there 
is absolutely no allegation that the parties established this 
business for anything more than their own personal benefit. The 
court accordingly concludes that this was a personal agreement 
between Gary and Dale Ostler. The obligations of Dale Ostler to 
continue conducting business as had been agreed in years previous 
was an obligation to Gary alone and ended when Gary died, just as 
surely as Gary's obligations to Dale cannot be enforced beyond the 
grave. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the agreements between Dale and Gary Ostler were not 
enforceable as a matter of contract law under the Utah Revised 
Business Corporation Act, and because they were personal agreements 
not enforceable under principles of equity, Defendants Motions to 
Dismiss are hereby GRANTED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the Court, and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this V 
~7?~ day of June, 2005, 
/ 
Judge Bruce Lubeck 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS L. STOWELL, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
OF GARY W. OSTLER, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OSTLER INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 
Llah coiporation; OSTLER PROPERTY 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah 
corporation; DALE OSTLER and VYRON 
OSTLER, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, Douglas L. Stowell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary W. Ostler, 
deceased, hereby demands trial by jury and complains as follows and against the Defendants 
Ostler International, Inc., Ostler Property Development, Inc., Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. ' J M ' / 3 L 4 S 5 S 
Judge Xu U c, iL~ 
(Jury Demanded) 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff, Douglas L. Stowell, is Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary 
Ostler, deceased, having been so appointed by this Court on September 17, 2003, m Probate Case 
No. 033901263 The decedent, Gary Ostler, ("Decedent") died on July 13, 2003. 
2. Decedent, and Defendants Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler are brothers. 
3 Defendant, Ostler International, Inc. ("Ostler International"), is a Utah corporation 
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. Defendant, Ostler Property Development, Inc. ("Ostler Property Development"), 
is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler are Directois of Ostler International and of Ostler 
Property Development and are officers of Ostler Property Development Vyron Ostler is an 
officer of Ostler International 
6. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims set forth herein pursuant to § 78-3-
4(1), Utah Code Annotated 
7 The herein causes of action arise in Salt Lake County, Utah and one or more of 
the Defendants resides or maintains a principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
wherefore, venue properly lies in this County pursuant to § 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. Decedent and Dale Ostler incorporated Ostler International about January 13, 1988 
with each issued and holding 50% of all shares of capital stock of the company. Each intended 
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and represented to the other of them that each would own and control one-half of the equity 
interest of the company. 
9. Decedent and Dale Ostler incorporated Ostler Property Development about July 
14, 1993, with each issued and holding 50% of all shares of capital stock of the company Each 
intended and represented to the other of them that each would own and control one-half of the 
equity interest of the company. 
10. Until Decedent's death, all shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of 
Ostler Property Development issued and outstanding were held 50% by Decedent and 50% by 
Dale Ostler. 
11. Since Decedent's death, all issued and outstanding shares of capital stock of Ostler 
International and of Ostler Property Development have been held 50% by Dale Ostler and 50% by 
Decedent's estate. 
12. At all times prior to Decedent's death, Decedent and Dale Ostler were and served 
as the Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development 
13. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that on one or more brief occasions, 
prior to Decedent's death, and at the request of Decedent and of Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler was a 
nominal and non-participating member of the Board of Directors of Ostler International. 
14. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that on one or more brief occasions, 
prior to Decedent's death, and at the request of Decedent and of Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler was a 
nominal and non-participating member of the Board of Directors of Ostler Property Development. 
15. Prior to Decedent's death, Ostler International had historically distnbuted more 
than 80% of its net profits to Decedent and Dale Ostler as shareholders of the company. The 
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distributions were made regularly and approximately quarterly, 50% to Decedent and 50% to Dale 
Ostler. 
16. Pursuant to the annual report filed by Ostler International with the Utah 
Department of Commerce on or about March 26, 1998, it was represented that Vyron Ostler had 
been removed as a Director of the company and that the company's Board of Directors consisted 
of two members. Further, the Annual Report which the company filed with Utah Department of 
Commerce on November 7, 2003 declared the directors of the company, to be Dale Ostler and 
Vyron Ostler. 
17. Some time after Decedent's death, Dale Ostler appointed Vyron Ostler to be a 
member of the Board of Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development. It 
was Dale Ostler's intention that he and Vyron Ostler constitute the Board of Directors of each 
company. 
18. Vyron Ostler was not a shareholder of either Ostler International or of Ostler 
Property Development at any time prior to the death of the Decedent. 
19. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that no bylaws for Ostler International 
have been enacted or adopted. 
20. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that no bylaws for Ostler Property 
Development have been enacted or adopted. 
21. All policy and practices for the operation of Ostler [nternational and for the 
operation of Ostler Property Development, including the conduct of the business of each company 
and the making of net income distributions to shareholders of each company was formulated and 
implemented only and solely by Decedent and Dale Ostler as the only shareholders of each 
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company and with the consent of the other of them. No company policies, programs, business 
ventures or net income distributions were undertaken without their joint and mutual consent. All 
decisions and policies of both Ostler International and Ostler Property Development and of the 
Board of Directors of each company were contingent, conditional and based upon the mutual 
consent and approval of said shareholders. It was the understanding, agreement and practice of 
each company's board of directors and each member thereof that the business and affairs of the 
company should and would be undertaken and managed only in accordance with such mutual 
consent of the company's shareholders. 
22. It was the intention, design and purpose of Decedent and of Dale Ostler that shares 
of the capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development neither should nor 
would, except upon their mutual consent and agreement as shareholders, be offered or provided to 
any other person. 
23. Pursuant to §§ 75-3-703, 75-3-708, 75-3-710 and 75-3-714, Utah Code Annotated 
Douglas L. Stowell as Personal Representative of the Decedent's Estate is charged to and does 
hold all rights and interests held by Decedent at the time of Decedent's death, including all right, 
title and interest of the Decedent in and to the shares of capital stock of both Ostler International 
and of Ostler Property Development owned and held by Decedent. Plaintiff holds such 
ownership, title and interest, in trust, as successor in interest to Decedent and for and in behalf of 
the creditors and beneficiaries of Decedent's estate. 
24. Plaintiff has made demand or does hereby demand that Defendants recognize 
Plaintiff as entitled to and holding the same right and interest held by Decedent as formulated and 
implemented by Decedent and Dale Ostler pursuant to their past custom, usage and course of 
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dealing and as was recognized by the directors and officers of Ostler International and of Ostler 
Property Development. Plaintiff has demanded or does hereby demand that the business of Ostler 
International and of Ostler Property Development be conducted only m accordance with the past 
custom, usage and course of dealing between Decedent and Dale Ostler and that no new policy of 
either company be adopted or pursued or business conducted without the mutual consent of 
Plaintiff and Dale Ostler. 
25. Defendants have not recognized and performed in accordance with the custom, 
usage and course of dealing formulated and implemented between Decedent and Dale Ostler. 
They have failed and refused to permit Plaintiffs involvement in the determination and 
implementation of policy and the conduct of the business of Ostler International and of Ostler 
Property Development and have failed and refused to require that such policy be formulated and 
implemented only with the mutual consent of Plaintiff and Dale Ostler. In particular the 
Defendants' 
(a) Have adopted and implemented policies to which Plaintiff is not in 
agreement. 
(b) Have failed to call and conduct a meeting of the Shareholders to afford 
Plaintiff his right to vote the shares of capital stock of Ostler International 
and of Ostler Property Development and which he holds as a shareholder of 
each company. 
(c) Have nominated, appointed or elected one or more members of the Board 
of Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development 
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without prior notice to, consulting with and obtaining the agreement of 
Plaintiff. 
(d) Intend to issue additional shares of capital stock of Ostler International and 
of Ostler Property Development to one or more of the Defendants and to 
third parties allegedly and purportedly in compensation for services 
rendered or to be rendered by such persons to Ostler International and to 
Ostler Property Development. The issuance of such shares will compromise 
and impair the value of the shares held by Plaintiff and the value of 
Plaintiffs interest in each company. 
(e) Intend to retain in Ostler International and in Ostler Property Development 
the preponderant part of all net earnings of the company and to disburse 
only a nominal portion of the amount to which Plaintiff is entitled. 
(f) Have failed and refused to make regular distributions of net income of 
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development as historically 
made and as agreed between Decedent and Dale Ostler and in particular, 
have refused to make such distributions to which Plaintiff is entitled. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Contract - Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International) 
26. Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 
above. 
27. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that it was the agreement of 
Decedent and Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International and the custom, usage and course 
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of dealing of they and any other director and the officers of Ostler International, that all policy of 
the company would be adopted and implemented and the company managed, operated and its 
business conducted only upon and pursuant to the mutual consent and agreement of the 
company's shareholders Both Decedent and Dale Ostler agreed that in consideration for such 
agreement of the other and such course of dealing, that they would continue to maintain, operate 
and conduct the business of Ostler International only for their mutual financial benefit and that 
neither would commission, engage in or conduct any business policy or activity to which the other 
did not agree Prior to the death of Decedent, the business of the company was managed, operated 
and conducted m accordance with and pursuant to said agreement, custom and usage and 
Decedent, Dale Ostlei, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International performed m accordance therewith 
28 Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Decedent and Dale Ostlei 
further agreed that except upon their mutual consent and agreement as shareholders of Ostler 
International, that shares of the capital stock of the company would neither be offered nor 
provided to any other person 
29. Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International have breached their agreement 
with Decedent and with Plaintiff in the particulars as set forth and pled in paragraphs 25(a) to and 
including 25(f) 
30. These Defendants have further breached their agreement and their duty and 
obligation thereunder, to not adopt or implement or cause or permit Ostler International to adopt 
or implement any policy or business practice without the approval and consent of Plaintiff as 
successor in interest to Decedent's right and interest under the Agreement 
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31 As a consequence of the failure and refusal of these Defendants to recognize and 
continue to perform m accordance with their agreement, custom, usage and course of dealing with 
Decedent and their refusal to permit Plaintiffs involvement m the determination and 
implementation of policy and the conduct of the business of Ostler International, Plaintiff does not 
have an adequate remedy at law against these Defendants and, is entitled to an order of the Court 
requiring these Defendants to specifically perform in accordance with their agreement, custom, 
usage and couise of dealing with the Decedent and in particular 
(a) To adopt and implement policies and business practices of Ostler 
International only with the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successor and 
Dale Ostler 
(b) To forthwith call and conduct a meeting of the shareholders, with proper 
and timely notice to Plaintiff, and to there afford and permit Plaintiff his 
right to vote the shares of capital stock of Ostler International which he 
holds as a shareholder of the company 
(c) To elect or appoint members of Ostler International's Board of Directors 
only upon propel and timely notice to Plaintiff or his successor, and the 
mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successoi and Dale Ostler 
(d) To not issue additional shares of capital stock of Ostler International 
without the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successor and Dale Ostler 
(e) To disburse all net earnings of Ostler International in accordance with the 
custom, course of dealing and agreement between Decedent and Dale 
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Ostler unless otherwise mutually agreed between Plaintiff or his successor 
and Dale Ostler. 
In the event that the failure of these Defendants to perform in accordance with their agreement, 
custom and course of dealing with Decedent causes damage to Plaintiff then in that event, 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against such Defendants for damages in an amount to be 
determined by the Court. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Contract - Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler Property Development) 
32. Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 
above. 
33. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that it was the agreement of 
Decedent and Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler Property Development and the custom, usage 
and course of dealing of they and any other director and the officers of Ostler Property 
Development, that all policy of the company would be adopted and implemented and the 
company managed, operated and its business conducted only upon and pursuant to the mutual 
consent and agreement of the company's shareholders. Both Decedent and Dale Ostler agreed 
that in consideration for such agreement of the other and such course of dealing, that they would 
continue to maintain, operate and conduct the business of Ostler Property Development only for 
their mutual financial benefit and that neither would commission, engage in or conduct any 
business policy or activity to which the other did not agree. Prior to the death of Decedent, the 
business of the company was managed, operated and conducted in accordance with and pursuant 
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to said agreement, custom and usage and Decedent, Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler 
Property Development performed in accordance therewith. 
34. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Decedent and Dale Ostler 
further agreed that except upon their mutual consent and agreement as a shareholder of Ostler 
Property Development, that shares of the capital stock of the company would neither be offered 
nor provided to any other person. 
35. Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler Property Development have breached their 
agreement with Decedent and with Plaintiff in the particulars as set forth and pled in paragraphs 
25(a) to and including 25(f). 
36. Those Defendants have further breached their agreement and their duty and 
obligation thereunder, to not adopt or implement or cause or permit Ostler Property Development 
to adopt or implement any policy or business practice without the approval and consent of 
Plaintiff as successor in interest to Decedent's right and interest under the Agreement. 
37. As a consequence of the failure and refusal of these Defendants to recognize and 
continue to perform in accordance with their agreement, custom, usage and course of dealing 
with Decedent and their refusal to permit Plaintiffs involvement in the determination and 
implementation of policy and the conduct of the business of Ostler Property Development, 
Plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law against these Defendants and, is entitled to an 
order of the Court requiring these Defendants to specifically perform in accordance with their 
agreement, custom, usage and course of dealing with the Decedent and in particular: 
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(a) To adopt and implement policies and business practices of Ostler Property 
Development only with the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successor 
and Dale Ostler 
(b) To forthwith call and conduct a meeting of the shareholders, with proper 
and timely notice to Plaintiff, and to theie afford and permit Plaintiff his 
nght to vote the shares of capital stock of Ostler Property Development 
which he holds as a shareholder of the company 
(c) To elect or appoint members of Ostler Property Development's Board of 
Directors only upon proper and timely notu e to Plaintiff or his successor, 
and the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successors and Dale Ostler 
(d) To not issue additional shares of capital stock of Ostler Property 
Development without the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successor and 
Dale Ostler 
(e) To disburse all net earnings of Ostler Pioperty Development in accordance 
with the custom, course of dealing and agreement between Decedent and 
Dale Ostler unless otherwise mutually agreed between Plaintiff or his 
successor and Dale Ostler 
In the event that the failure of these Defendants to perform m accordance with their agreement, 
custom and course of dealing with Decedent causes damage to Plaintiff then m that event, 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against such Defendants for damages m an amount to be 
determined by the Court 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Constructive Trust - Ostler International and Ostler Property Development 
Shares - Dale Ostler, Ostler International and Ostler Property Development) 
38 Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 
above 
39 The acquisition, holding and ownership of 50% of the shares of capital stock of 
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development by Decedent and 50% by Dale Ostler 
was foi the purpose of assuring that neithei shaieholdei could, without the other of them, 
formulate and implement policy and business practices of Ostler of International and of Ostler 
Property Development Their purpose was to assure that each would require the consent of the 
other to the operation and management of both of the companies 
40 It was not possible for any policy governing the conduct of the business of Ostler 
International or of Ostler Property Development to have been validly and legally formulated and 
implemented without the mutual consent and agreement of both shareholders 
41 Since Decedent's death, the policy and business of Ostler International and of 
Ostler Property Development has been undertaken and pursued by each company and by Dale 
Ostler all without notice to or the involvement, participation and consent of Plaintiff and all 
contiary to the purposes, agieement and course of dealing of Decedent and Dale Ostler as the 
shaieholders of each company 
42 On principals of equity, Plaintiff is entitled to an order of the Court directed at 
Dale Ostler, Ostler International and Ostler Property Development declanng the imposition of a 
constructive trust on all of the shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler 
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Property Development, with said shares to be held for the joint and mutual benefit of Dale Ostler 
and Plaintiff and his successor. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Quasi - Contract - Unjust Enrichment - Dale Ostler) 
43. Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 
and paragraphs 39 through 41 above. 
44. Decedent and Dale Ostler each thereby conferred a benefit on the other and each 
had knowledge of said benefit and voluntarily accepted such benefit from the other. 
45. Dale Ostler now refuses to permit the policy and business of Ostler International 
and of Ostler Property Development to be developed and implemented by he and Plaintiff as 
shareholders of the companies and refuses to cause or permit each said company and its board of 
directors to condition the formulation and implementation of policy upon the mutual consent and 
agreement of said shareholders and consequently by his inaction or improper action causes and 
permits each of the companies to pursue policies and practices to Ihe financial advantage and 
benefit of Dale Ostler and the disadvantage of Plaintiff causing Dale Ostler to be unjustly 
enriched thereby. 
46. As a consequence of the unjust enrichment of Dale Ostler, Plaintiff has sustained 
damages in an amount to be determined by the Court and for which Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment against Dale Ostler. 
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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty - Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler) 
47 Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 thorough 
28, 33 and 34, above 
48 Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler as directors and officers of Ostler International and 
of Ostler Property Development owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, as a shareholder of each 
company, to neither adopt or implement any policy or conduct any business of such company 
contrary to Plaintiffs interest as a shareholder m the company and his rights as agreed and 
extended pursuant to Decedent's agreement express oi implied with Dale Ostler and their 
custom, usage and couise of dealing and that of the directors and officers of each company 
49 Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler have bleached their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by 
engaging m the conduct as more particularly set forth m paragraph 25, above 
50 As a consequence of the breach by said Defendants of their fiduciary duty owing 
to Plaintiff, Plaintiff as successor m interest to Decedent, has sustained damages in an amount to 
be determined by the Court and for which Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Dale Ostler 
and Vyron Ostler, jointly and severally 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Promissory Estoppel - Dale Ostler) 
51 Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 
above 
52 Decedent and Dale Ostler as shareholders of Ostler International and of Ostler 
Property Development piomised each other that policies for the operation and conduct of the 
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business of each company would be adopted and implemented only with and based upon their 
mutual consent. 
53. Decedent acted in reasonable reliance on the promises made by Dale Ostler who 
should and did reasonably expect Decedent to so rely and as a consequence thereof, Decedent did 
similarly promise to Dale Ostler and in so doing, did not adopt or implement any policy of Ostler 
International or of Ostler Property Development without the consent of Dale Ostler. 
54. Dale Ostler was aware of the mutual promises so made by he and Decedent and of 
all facts material thereto and knew that Decedent relied on Dale Ostler's promises so made. 
55. As a consequence of the failure and refusal of Dale Ostler to recognize and 
continue to perform in accordance with his promises made to Decedent and his refusal to permit 
Plaintiffs involvement in the determination and implementation of policy and the conduct of the 
business of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development, Plaintiff does not have an 
adequate remedy at law against Dale Ostler and, is entitled to an order of the Court requiring 
Dale Ostler to specifically perform in accordance with his promises made to Decedent and in 
particular: 
(a) To adopt and implement policies and business practices of Ostler 
International and Ostler Property Development only with the mutual 
consent of Plaintiff or his successor and Dale Ostler. 
(b) To forthwith call and conduct a meeting of the shareholders, with proper 
and timely notice to Plaintiff, and to there afford and permit Plaintiff his 
right to vote the shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler 
Property Development which he holds as a shareholder of each company. 
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(c) To elect or appoint members of the Board of Directors of Ostler 
International and of Ostler Property Development only upon proper and 
timely notice to Plaintiff or his successoi, and the mutual consent of 
Plaintiff or his successoi and Dale Ostler 
(d) To not issue additional shares of capital stock of Ostler International and 
of Ostler Property Development without the mutual consent of Plaintiff or 
his successor and Dale Ostler 
(e) To disburse all net earnings of Ostler International and of Ostler Property 
Development m accordance with the custom, course of dealing and 
agieement between Decedent and Dale Ostler unless otherwise mutually 
agreed between Plaintiff or his successoi and Dale Ostlei 
In the event that the failure of Dale Ostler to perform m accordance with his promises made to 
Decedent causes damage to Plaintiff then in that event, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
Dale Ostler for damages m an amount to be determined by the Court 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Accounting - All Defendants) 
56 Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 
above 
57 Plaintiff is entitled to an order of the Court requiring that Defendants provide to 
Plaintiff during the pendency of this action, (1) all of the records, information and reports of 
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development as contemplated and provided by ^ 16-
10a-1601 and 16-10a-1602, Utah Code Ann and not limited to excerpts from or summaries of 
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said records and reports In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to an order requiring that Defendants 
provide to Plaintiff dunng the pendency of this action, (2) an audited financial statement for each 
company for each calendar year prepared in accordance with geneially accepted accounting 
principals, (3) unaudited financial statements for each company for each calendar month dunng 
the pendency of this action and showing in leasonable detail the assets and liabilities of the 
company and the results of the company's business operations, (4) the number of shares of 
capital stock of each company which on December 31, 2003 weie proposed or committed to be 
issued to any person and the name of such person and (5) the number of shares of capital stock of 
each company which on December 1, 2004 were proposed or committed to be issued to any 
person and the name of each such person 
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Declaratory Judgment - All Defendants) 
58. Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained m paragraphs 1 through 25 
above 
59. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment pursuant to ^§ 78-33-1 through 78-33-13, Utah 
Code Annotated, declaring that Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler, Ostler International, Ostler Property 
Development and all officers and directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property 
Development are obligated to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns, as shareholders of 
the companies, and as follows 
(a) To permit Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns to be involved m 
the formulation and implementation of policies for the conducting of the 
business of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development and to 
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neither adopt or implement policies or conduct business of the companies 
to which Plaintiff or his successors and assigns are not in agreement. 
(b) To cause there to be called at least annually a meeting of shareholders of 
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development and there permit 
Plaintiff or his successors and assigns the right and opportunity to vote 
their shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler Property 
Development. 
(c) To neither nominate, appoint or elect members of the Board of Directors 
of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development without notice 
to, consulting with and obtaining the agreement of the Plaintiff or 
Plaintiffs successors and assigns. 
(d) To neither cause nor permit any current and existing members of the 
Board of Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property 
Development from serving or continuing to serve as Directors without the 
mutual consent of Dale Ostler and Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successor or 
assigns. 
(e) To cause both Ostler International and Ostler Property Development to 
reacquire any shares of capital stock of such company issued without the 
consent of Decedent or Plaintiff and that such shares be reacquired by the 
issuing company with no cost, expense or loss to Plaintiff or any 
dimimshment in the value of the shares of capital stock held by Plaintiff. 
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(f) To not issue or cause to be issued any shares of the capital stock of Ostler 
International or of Ostler Property Development without the consent of 
Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors or assigns. 
(g) To cause all or such fractional portion of the net income of Ostler 
International and of Ostler Property Development as historically disbursed 
to Decedent and to Dale Ostler, to be disbursed and paid over to 
shareholders regularly and approximately quarterly, unless consent and 
authorization is otherwise first obtained from Dale Ostler and from 
Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors and assigns, 
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Injunction - all Defendants) 
60. Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 
above. 
61. Plaintiff is entitled to a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 
during the pendency of this action enjoining Defendants from: 
(a) Preventing or discouraging Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns 
from being engaged in the formulation and implementation of policies for 
the conducting of the business of Ostler International and of Ostler 
Property Development and from adopting or implementing policies to 
which Plaintiff or his successors and assigns are not in agreement. 
(b) Failing to cause there to be called at least annually a meeting of 
shareholders of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development 
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and there permitting Plaintiff or his successors and assigns the right and 
opportunity to vote then shares of capital stock of Ostlei International and 
of Ostler Property Development 
(c) Nominating, appointing or electing members of the Board of Directors of 
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development without notice to, 
consulting with and obtaining the agreement of the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs 
successors and assigns 
(d) Causing or permitting any current and existing members of the Boaid of 
Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development to 
serve or continuing to serve as Directors without the mutual consent of 
Dale Ostlei and Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successor 01 assigns 
(e) Issuing or causing to be issued any shares of the capital stock of Ostler 
International and of Ostler Property Development without the consent of 
Plaintiff or Plaintiff s successors or assigns 
(f) Permitting or accepting the voting of any shares of the capital stock of 
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development issued without 
the consent of Decedent or of Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors or assigns 
(g) Failing to disburse and pay over to Shareholders of Ostler International 
and Ostler Property Development regularly and approximately quarterly all 
or such fractional portion of the net income of each company as 
historically disbursed to Decedent and to Dale Ostler, unless consent and 
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authorization is otherwise first obtained from Dale Ostler and from 
Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors and assigns 
62 Plaintiff is entitled, at the conclusion of this action, to a permanent injunction 
enjoining the Defendants, their successors and any assigns all as provided in paragraph 61, and 
further, from causing or permitting, without the written mutual approval and consent of Dale 
Ostler and Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors and assigns, the adoption or implementation of any 
policy of Ostlei International or of Ostler Property Development or the causing of either 
company to engage in or conduct its business 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff pi ays for judgment against the Defendants as follows 
1 On his FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a decree of specific performance against 
Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International requinng the pei formance by said Defendants, 
then successors and assigns all as provided in paragraph 31 and foi judgment against said 
Defendants for damages m an amount to be determined by the Court and such other relief as the 
Court may deem proper in the premises 
2 On his SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a decree of specific performance 
against Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler Property Development requiring the performance by 
said Defendants, their successors and assigns all as provided m paragraph 37 and for judgment 
against said Defendants for damages in an amount to be determined by the Court and such othei 
relief as the Court may deem proper m the premises 
3 On his THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for an order of the Court directed at Dale 
Ostler, Ostler International and Ostler Property Development imposing and creating a 
constructive trust on all of the shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler 
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Pioperty Development with said shaies to be held for the joint and mutual benefit of Dale Ostler 
and Plaintiff and his successoi Plaintiff further prays for such other relief as the Court may 
deem piopei m the premises 
4 On his FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for judgment against Dale Ostlei for 
damages m an amount to be determined by the Court and such other relief as the Court may deem 
pioper m the premises 
5 On his FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for judgment against Dale Ostler and 
Vyion Ostler, jointly and severally, for damages m an amount to be determined by the Court and 
such other relief as the Court may deem proper m the premises 
6 On his SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a decree of specific performance against 
Dale Ostler lequirmg the peiformance by said Defendant, his successors and assigns all as 
piovided in paiagraph 55 and for judgment against said Defendant for damages in an amount to 
be determined by the Court and such other relief as the Court may deem proper m the premises 
7 On his SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, foi an order declaring and lequmng 
that Defendants and each of them, provide an accounting and information in accordance with and 
pursuant to the requirements as set forth m paragraph 57 of the Complaint 
8 On his EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a judgment declaring that Dale Ostler, 
Vyron Ostler, Ostler International, Ostler Property Development and the other officers and 
directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development are obligated, as a matter of 
law, to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns to adopt and implement policy of and for 
Ostlei International and for Ostlei Property Development and to conduct the business of each 
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company only in accordance with and pursuant to the requirements as set forth in paragraph 59 of 
this Complaint. 
9. On his NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction during the pendency of this action enjoining Defendants, their successors 
and assigns all as provided in paragraph 61 of this Complaint. Further, for a permanent 
injunction to be issued at the conclusion hereof enjoining the Defendants, their successors and 
any assigns all as provided in paragraph 61, and from causing or permitting, without the written 
mutual approval and consent of Dale Ostler and Plaintiff or Plaintiff s successors and assigns, the 
adoption or implementation of any policy of Ostler International and of Ostler Property 
Development or the causing of Ostler International or Ostler Property Development to engage in 
or conduct its business without the mutual approval and consent of Dale Ostler or any of his 
assigns, and of Plaintiff or his successors and assigns. 
10. On ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF for costs of court and such further relief as the 
Court may deem proper in the premises. 
tctk 
DATED this / £ day of December, 2004. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Plaintiffs Address: 
Douglas L. Stowell, Esq. 
307 East Stanton Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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the trust agreement and the shares must be registered in the 
name of the trustee. Typically, the trust agreement provides 
that all attributes of beneficial ownership other than the 
power to vote are retained by the beneficial owners. In 
addition, the voting trustees may issue to the beneficial 
owners voting trust certificates which may be transferable in 
much the same way as shares. 
Upon the creation of the voting trust, the trustees must 
prepare a list of the beneficial owners and deliver it, together 
with a copy of the agreement, to the corporation's principal 
office, where both documents are available for inspection by 
shareholders under section 720, This simple disclosure re-
quirement eliminates the possibility that the voting trust may 
be used to create "secret, uncontrolled combinations of stock-
holders to acquire control of the corporation to the possible 
detriment of non-participating shareholders." Lehrman v. 
Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 807 (Del. 1966). 
The purpose of section 730 is not to impose narrow or 
technical requirements on voting trusts. For example, a voting 
trust that by its terms extends beyond the 10-year maximum 
should be treated as being valid for the maximum permissible 
term of 10 years. 
b. Extension or Renewal of Voting Trust. 
Section 730(3) permits a voting trust to be extended for 
successive terms of up to 10 years, commencing with the date 
the first shareholder signs the extension agreement. Share-
holders who do not agree to an extension are entitled to the 
return of their shares upon the expiration of the original term. 
731. Voting Agreements 
Section 731(1) explicitly recognizes agreements among two 
or more shareholders as to the voting of shares and makes 
clear that these agreements are not subject to the rules 
relating to a voting trust. These agreements are often referred 
to as "pooling agreements." The only formal requirements are 
that they be in writing and signed by all the participating 
shareholders; in other respects their validity is to be judged as 
any other contract. They are not subject to the 10-year 
limitation applicable to voting trusts. 
Section 731(2) provides that voting agreements may be 
specifically enforceable. A voting agreement may provide its 
own enforcement mechanism, as by the appointment of a 
proxy to vote all shares subject to the agreement; the appoint-
ment may be made irrevocable under section 722. If no 
enforcement mechanism is provided, a court may order spe-
cific enforcement of the agreement and order the votes cast as 
the agreement contemplates. This section recognizes that 
damages are not likely to be an appropriate remedy for breach 
of a voting agreement, and also avoids the result reached in 
Ringling Bros. Barnam & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 
A.2d 441 (Del. 1947), where the court held that the appropri-
ate remedy to enforce a pooling agreement was to refuse to 
permit any voting of the breaching party's shares. 
732. Shareholder Agreements 
f Shareholders of closely-held corporations, ranging from 
family businesses to joint ventures owned by large public 
corporations, frequently enter into agreements that govern 
the operation of the enterprise. In the past, various types of 
Sshareholder agreements were invalidated by courts for a 
variety of reasons, including so-called "sterilization" of the 
board of directors and failure to follow the statutory norms of 
the applicable corporation act. See, e.g., Long Park, Inc. v. 
Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 
633 (1948). The more modern decisions reflect a greater 
willingness to uphold shareholder agreements. See, e.g., 
Galler v. Galler, 32 111. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). In 
addition, many state corporation acts now contain provisions 
validating shareholder agreements. Earlier versions of the 
Model Act had never expressly validated shareholder agree-
ments. 
Rather than relying on further uncertain and sporadic 
development of the law in the courts, section 732, which was 
, added to the Model Act in 1991, rejects the older line of cases. 
It adds an important element of predictability previously 
absent from the Model Act and affords participants in closely-
held corporations greater contractual freedom to tailor the 
rules of their enterprise. The drafters have elected to add 
section 732 of the Model Act to the Revised Act. 
Section 732 is not intended to establish or legitimize an 
alternative form of corporation. Instead, it is intended to add, 
within the context of the traditional corporate structure, legal 
certainty to shareholder agreements that embody various 
aspects of the business arrangement established by the share-
holders to meet their business and personal needs. The subject 
matter of these arrangements includes governance of the 
/ entity, allocation of the economic return from the business, 
' and other aspects of the relationships among shareholders, 
directors and the corporation which are part of the business 
arrangement. Section 732 also recognizes that many of the 
corporate norms contained in the Model Act (and Revised Act), 
as well as the corporation statutes of most states, were 
designed with an eye towards public companies, where man-
agement and share ownership are quite distinct. Cf. 1 O'Neal 
& Thompson, O'Neal's Close Corporations, section 5.06 (3d 
ed.). These functions are often conjoined in the close corpora-
tion. Thus, section 732 validates for nonpublic corporations 
various types of agreements among shareholders even when 
the agreements are inconsistent with the statutory norms 
contained in the Model Act and Revised Act. 
Importantly, section 732 only addresses the parties to the 
shareholder agreement, their transferees, and the corpora-
tion, and does not have any binding legal effect on the state, 
creditors, or other third persons. 
Section 732 supplements the other provisions of the Model 
Act and Revised Act. If an agreement is not in conflict with 
another section of the Revised Act, no resort need be made to 
section 732, with its requirement of unanimity. For example, 
special provisions can be included in the articles of incorpora-
tion or bylaws with less than unanimous shareholder agree-
ment so long as such provisions are not in conflict with other 
provisions of the Revised Act. Similarly, section 732 would not 
have to be relied upon to validate typical buy-sell agreements 
among two or more shareholders or the covenants and other 
terms of a stock purchase agreement entered into in connec-
tion with the issuance of shares by a corporation. 
The types of provisions validated by section 732 are many 
and varied. Section 732(1) defines the range of permissible 
subject matter for shareholder agreements largely by illustra-
tion, enumerating seven types of agreements that are ex-
pressly validated to the extent they would not be valid absent 
section 732. The enumeration of these types of agreements is 
not exclusive; nor should it give rise to a negative inference 
that an agreement of a type that is or might be embraced by 
one of the categories of section 732(1) is, ipso facto, a type of 
agreement that is not valid unless it complies with section 
732. Section 732(1) also contain a "catch all" which adds a 
measure of flexibility to the seven enumerated categories. 
Omitted from the enumeration in section 732(1) is a provi-
sion found in the Close Corporation Supplement and in the 
statutes of many of the states, broadly validating any arrange-
ment the effect of which is to treat the corporation as a 
partnership. This type of provision was considered to be too 
elastic and indefinite, as well as unnecessary in light of the 
more detailed enumeration of permissible subject areas con-
tained in section 732(1). Note, however, that under section 
732(6) the fact that an agreement authorized by section 732(1) 
or its performance treats the corporation as a partnership is 
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not a ground for imposing personal liability on the parties if 
the agreement is otherwise authorized by subsection (1) 
a Section 732(1) 
Subsection (1) is the heart of section 732 It states that 
certain types of agreements are effective among the share-
holders and the corporation even if inconsistent with another 
provision of the Revised Act Thus, an agreement authorized 
by section 732 is, by virtue of that section, "not inconsistent 
with law within the meaning of sections 202(2)(b) and 206(2) 
of the Revised Act In contrast, a shareholder agreement that 
is not inconsistent with any provisions of the Revised Act is 
not subject to the requirements of section 732 
The range of agreements validated by section 732(1) is 
expansive, though not unlimited The most difficult problem 
encountered in crafting a shareholder agreement validation 
provision is to determine the reach of the provision Some 
states have tried to articulate the limits of a shareholder 
agreement validation provision in terms of negative grounds, 
stating that no shareholder agreement shall be invalid on 
certain specified grounds See eg Del Code Ann Tit 8, 
sections 350 354 (1983) NC Gen Stat section 55-
73(b)(1982) The deficiencv in this type of statute is the 
uncertainty introduced bv the ever present possibility of 
articulating another ground on which to challenge the validity 
of the agreement Other states have provided that shareholder 
agreements may waive or alter all provisions in the corpora-
tion act except certain enumerated provisions that cannot be 
varied See eg Cal Corp Code section 300(b)-(c) (West 1989 
and Supp 1990) The difficulty with this approach is that any 
enumeration of the provisions that can never be varied will 
almost inevitably be subjective arbitrary, and incomplete 
The approach chosen in section 732 is more pragmatic It 
defines the types of agreements that can be validated largeiv 
by illustration The seven specific categories that are listed are 
designed to cover the most frequently used arrangements The 
outer boundary is provided by section 732(1 )(h) which pro-
vides an additional 'catch all" for any provisions that, in a 
manner inconsistent with any other provision of the Revised 
Act, otherwise govern the exercise of the corporate powers, the 
management of the business and affairs of the corporation, or 
the relationship between and among the shareholders, the 
directors, and the corporation or any of them Section 732(1) 
validates virtually all types of shareholder agreements that, 
m practice normally concern shareholders and their advisors 
Given the breadth of section 732(1), any provision that may 
be contained in the articles of incorporation with a majority 
•ote under sections 202(2)(b)(i) and (n), as well as under 
•ection 841 may also be effective if contained in a shareholder 
•greement that complies with section 732 
The provisions of a shareholder agreement authorized by 
•ection 732(1) will often, in operation, conflict with the literal 
language of more than one section of the Revised Act, and 
courts should in such cases construe all related sections of the 
Revised Act flexibly and in a manner consistent with the 
underlying intent of the shareholder agreement Thus, for 
Sample, in the case of an agreement that provides for 
lighted voting by directors, every reference in the Revised 
*& to a majority or other proportion of directors should be 
construed to refer to a majority or other proportion of the votes 
•»the directors 
^ While the outer limits of the catch-all provision of subsec-
tion 732Q)(h) are left uncertain, there are provisions of the 
Raised Act that cannot be overridden by resort to the catch-
•jL Subsection (l)(h), introduced by the term "otherwise," is 
intended to be read in context with the preceding seven 
Resections and to be subject to a ejusdem generis rule of 
'instruction Thus, in defining the outer limits, courts should 
,
e
°nsider whether the variation from the Revised Act under 
^nsideration is similar to the variations permitted by the first 
seven subsections Subsection (l)(h) is also subject to a public 
policy limitation, in tended to give courts express authority to 
restrict the scope of the catch-all where there are substantial 
issues of public policy at stake For example, a shareholder 
agreement that provides that the directors of the corporation 
have no duties of care or loyalty to the corporation or the 
shareholders would not be within the purview of section 
732(l)(h), because it is not sufficiently similar to the types of 
arrangements suggested by the first seven subsections of 
section 732(1) and because such a provision could be viewed as 
contrary to a public policy of substantial importance Simi-
larly, a provision that exculpates directors from Lability more 
broadly than permitted by section 841 likely would not be 
validated under section 732, because as the commentary to 
section 841 states, there are serious public policy reasons 
which support the few limitations that remain on the right to 
exculpate directors from liability Further development of the 
outer limits is left, however, for the courts 
As noted above shareholder agreements otherwise vali-
dated by section 732 are not legally binding on the state on 
creditors, or on other third parties For example an agree-
ment that dispenses with the need to make corporate filings 
required by the Revised Act would be ineffective Similarly, an 
agreement among shareholders that provides that only the 
president has authority to enter into contracts for the corpo-
ration would not, without more be binding against third 
parties, and ordinary principles of agencv, including the con-
cept of apparent authority, would continue to apply 
b Section 732(2) 
Section 732 minimizes the formal requirements for a share-
holder agreement so as not to restrict unduly the sharehold 
ers ability to take advantage of the flexibility the section 
provides Thus unldce comparable provisions in special close 
corporation legislation, it is not necessary to "opt in" to a 
special class of close corporations in order to obtain the 
benefits of section 732 An agreement can be validated under 
section 732 whether it is set forth m the articles of incorpora-
tion the bylaws cr in a separate agreement and whether or 
not section 732 is specifically referenced in the agreement The 
principal requirements aresimply that the agreement be m 
wnting and be approved or agreed to by all persons who are 
then shareholder? Where the corporation has a single share 
holder, the requirement of an "agreement among the share-
holders'' is satisfied by the unilateral action of the shareholder 
in establishing the terms of the agreement, evidenced by 
provisions in the articles or bylaws, or in a writing signed by 
the sole shareholder Although a writing signed by all the 
shareholders is not required where the agreement is contamed 
in articles of incorporation or bylaws unanimously approved, 
it may be desirable to have all the shareholders actually sign 
the instrument in order to establish unequivocally their agree-
ment Similarly, while transferees are bound by a valid share-
holder agreement, it may be desirable to obtain the affirmative 
wntten assent of the transferee at the time of the transfer 
Subsection (2) also established and permits amendments by 
less than unanimous agreement if the shareholder agreement 
so provides 
Section 732(2 requires unanimous shareholder approval 
regardless of entitlement to vote Unanimity is required 
because an agreement authorized by section 732 can effect 
material organic changes m the corporation's operation and 
structure, and in the rights and obligations of shareholders 
The requirement that the shareholder agreement be made 
known to the corporation is the predicate for the requirement 
in subsection (3) that share certificates or information state-
ments be legended to note the existence of the agreement No 
specific form of notification is required and the agreement 
need not be filed with the corporation In the case of share-
holder agreements m the articles or bylaws, the corporation 
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will necessarily have notice. In the case of shareholder agree-
ments outside the articles or bylaws, the requirement of 
signature by all of the shareholders will in virtually all cases 
be sufficient to constitute notification to the corporation, as 
one or more signatories will normally also be a director or an 
officer. 
c. Section 732(3). 
Section 732(3) addresses the effect of a shareholder agree-
ment on subsequent purchasers or transferees of shares. 
Typically, corporations with shareholder agreements also have 
restrictions on the transferability of the shares as authorized 
by section 627 of the Revised Act, thus lessening the practical 
effects of the problem in the context of voluntary transferees. 
Transferees of shares without knowledge of the agreement or 
those acquiring shares upon the death of an original partici-
pant in a close corporation may, however, be heavily impacted. 
Weighing the burdens on transferees against the burdens on 
the remaining shareholders in the enterprise, section 732(3) 
affirms the continued validity of the shareholder agreement on 
all transferees, whether by purchase, gift, operation of law, or 
otherwise. Unlike restrictions on transfer, it may be impossi-
ble to enforce a shareholder agreement against less than all o 
the shareholders. Thus, under section 732, one who inherit! 
shares subject to a shareholder agreement must continue to 
abide by the agreement. If that is not the desired result, care 
must be exercised at the initiation of the shareholder agree-
ment to ensure a different outcome, such as providing for a 
buy-back upon death. 
Where shares are transferred to a purchaser without knowl-
edge of a shareholder agreement, the validity of the agreement 
is similarly unaffected, but the purchaser is afforded a rescis-
sion remedy against the seller. The term "purchaser" imports 
consideration. Under subsection (3) the time at which notice to 
a purchaser is relevant for purposes of determining entitle-
ment to rescission is the time when a purchaser acquires the 
shares rather than when a commitment is made to acquire the 
shares. If the purchaser learns of the agreement after becom-
ing committed to purchase but before the acquisition of the 
shares, the purchaser should not be permitted to proceed with 
the purchase and still obtain the benefits of the remedies in 
section 732(3). Moreover, under contract principles and the 
securities laws a failure to disclose the existence of a share-
holder agreement would in most cases constitute the omission 
of a material fact and may excuse performance of the commit-
ment to purchase. The term purchaser includes a person 
acquiring shares upon initial issue or by transfer, and also 
includes a pledgee, for whom the time of purchase is the time 
the shares are pledged. 
Section 732 addresses the underlying rights that accrue to 
shares and shareholders and the validity of shareholder action 
which redefines those rights, as contrasted with questions 
regarding entitlement to ownership of the security, competing 
ownership claims, and disclosure issues. Consistent with this 
dichotomy, the rights and remedies available to purchasers 
under section 732(3) are independent of those provided by 
contract law, article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
securities laws and others outside the Revised Act. With 
respect to the related subject of restrictions on transferability 
of shares, note that section 732 does not directly address or 
validate such restrictions, which are governed instead by 
section 627 of the Act. However, if such restrictions are 
adopted as a part of a shareholder agreement that complies 
with the requirements of section 732, a court should construe 
broadly the concept of reasonableness under section 627 in 
determining the validity of such restrictions. 
Section 732(3) contains an affirmative requirement that the 
share certificate or information statement for the shares be 
legended to note the existence of a shareholder agreement. No 
specified form of legend is required, and a simple statement 
that "ft]he shares represented by this certificate are subject to 
a shareholder agreement" is sufficient. At that point a pur-
chaser must obtain a copy of the shareholder agreement from 
the transferor or proceed at the purchaser's peril. In the event 
a corporation fails to legend share certificates or information 
statements, a court may, in an appropriate case, imply a cause 
of action against the corporation in favor of an injured pur-
chaser without knowledge of a shareholder agreement. The 
circumstances under which such a remedy would be implied, 
the proper measure of damages, and other attributes of and 
limitations on such an implied remedy are left to development 
in the courts. 
If the purchaser has no actual knowledge of a shareholder 
agreement, and is not charged with knowledge by virtue of a 
legend on the certificate or information statement, the pur-
chaser has a rescission remedy against the transferor (which 
would be the corporation in the case of a new issue of shares). 
While the statutory rescission remedy provided in subsection 
(3) is nonexclusive, it is intended to be a purchaser's primary 
remedy. 
If the shares are certificated and duly legended, a purchaser 
is charged with notice of the shareholder agreement even if 
the purchaser never saw the certificate. Thus, a purchaser is 
exposed to risk if the purchaser does not ask to see the 
certificate at or prior to the purchase of the shares. In the case 
of uncertificated shares, however, the purchaser is not charged 
with notice of the shareholder agreement unless a duly-
legended information statement is delivered to the purchaser 
at or prior to the time of purchase. This different rule for 
uncertificated shares is intended to provide an additional 
safeguard to protect innocent purchasers, and is necessary 
because section 626(2) of the Revised Act and section 8-408 of 
the U.C.C. permit delivery of information statements after a 
transfer of shares. 
d. Section 732(4). 
Section 732(4) contains a self-executing termination provi-
sion for a shareholder agreement when the shares of the 
corporation become publicly held. The statutory norms in the 
Revised Act become more necessary and appropriate as the 
number of shareholders increases, as there is greater oppor-
tunity to acquire or dispose of an investment in the corpora-
tion, and as there is less opportunity for negotiation over the 
terms under which the enterprise will be conducted. Given 
that section 732 requires unanimity, however, in most cases a 
practical limit on the availability of a shareholder agreement 
will be reached before a public market develops. Subsection (4) 
rejects the use of an absolute number of shareholders in 
determining when the shelter of section 732 is lost. 
Section 732(5) through (7) contain a number of technical 
provisions. Subsection (5) provides a shift of liability from the 
directors to any person or persons in whom the discretion or 
powers otherwise exercised by the board of directors are 
vested. A shareholder agreement which provides for such a 
shift of responsibility, with the concomitant shift of liability 
provided by subsection (5), could also provide for exculpation 
from that liability to the extent otherwise authorized by the 
Revised Act. The transfer of liability provided by subsection 
(5) covers liabilities imposed on directors "by law," which is 
intended to include liabilities arising under the Revised Act, 
the common law, and statutory law outside the Revised Act. 
Nevertheless, there could be cases where subsection (5) is 
ineffective and where a director is exposed to liability qua 
director, even though under a shareholder agreement the 
director may have given up some or all of the powers normally 
exercised by directors. 
Subsection (6), based on the Close Corporation Supplement 
of the Model Act and the Texas statute, narrows the grounds 
for imposing personal liability on shareholders for the liabili-
ties of a corporation for acts or omissions authorized by a 
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shareholder agreement validated by section 732 Subsection 
(7) addresses shareholder agreements for corporations that 
are in the process of being organized and do not yet have 
shareholders 
The Revised Act does not, of course, address the tax status 
of a corporation formed under the Revised Act When an 
unorthodox arrangement is established pursuant to a share-
holder agreement authorized by section 732, that corporation 
could in some circumstances be deemed a partnership for tax 
purposes an issue to which counsel should be attuned, but 
which is not addressed in the Revised Act See Treas Reg 
section 301 7701-1 (as amended in 1977), Rev Rul 88-76, 
1988 2 C B 360 (company organized pursuant to Wyoming 
Limited Liability Company statute, classified for federal tax 
purposes as a partnership) 
Subpart D 
Derivative Proceedings 
740. Procedure in Derivative Proceedings 
The Model Act was amended in 1990 to include a series of 
sections providing detailed procedures and requirements for 
shareholder derivative suits The new provisions reflect a 
reappraisal of issues such as (a) whether demand upon the 
board of directors is required, and lb) the power of indepen-
dent directors to dismiss a derivative suit 
A great deal of controversy has surrounded the derivative 
suit, and widely different perceptions continue to exist as to 
the efficacy of such litigation It was beyond the scope of the 
effort undertaken by the Utah Business Corporation Act 
Revision Committee to analyze the various issues surrounding 
shareholder derivative suits or to suggest a solution to those 
issues The drafters felt the issue would be better addressed 
by a more focused effort conducted bv a group representing the 
various interests typically involved in such suits We would 
encourage a future review of the issues surrounding deriva-
tive suits and consideration of the desirability of implement-
ing the procedures and requirements imposed in the Model 
Act The enactment of new procedures would require appro-
pnate modifications of Rule 23 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
Section 740 follows the Model Act language that was super-
seded by the recent modifications to the Model Act This 
language is patterned in part after the procedures applicable 
to derivative actions as set forth in Rule 23 1 of both the 
Federal and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure The Revised Act 
specifies that the Utah rule is applicable to derivative actions 
covered by Section 740 
a Procedural Requirements 
The procedural requirements imposed by section 740 are as 
follows 
1 The plaintiff may be either a registered or beneficial 
owner of shares 
Manv statutes including early versions of the Model Act, 
Squired the plaintiff to be a shareholder "of record " This 
Uniting requirement was dropped in revising section 740, in 
Kght of the widespread use of street name or nominee owner-
ship of shares At the same time, it was determined that the 
beneficial owner of shares held in a voting trust should also be 
Permitted to serve as a plaintiff m a derivative suit These 
Ganges were accomplished by the addition of a special defl-
ation of shareholder" in subsection (6) to broaden the defl-
ation of that term m section 102 
2 The plaintiff must have been an owner of shares at 
the time of the transaction in question 
. 'Hie Model Act and the statutes of many states have long 
°nposed a ""contemporaneous ownership'* rule, l e , the plain-
tiff must have been an owner of shares at the time of the 
transaction in question This rule has been cnticized as being 
unduly narrow and technical and unnecessary to prevent the 
transfer or purchase of lawsuits A few states, particularly 
California, Cal G C L Section 800(B), have relaxed this rule 
to the extent of allowing some subsequent purchasers of 
shares to be plaintiffs in limited circumstances 
The decision to retaia the contemporaneous ownership rule 
in section 740 was based primarily on the view that it was 
simple, clear, and easy to apply while the California approach 
might encourage htigal ion on peripheral issues like the extent 
of the plaintiff's knowledge of the transaction in question 
when the shares were acquired Further, there has been no 
persuasive showing that the contemporaneous ownership rule 
has prevented the litigation of substantial suits since there 
appear to be many persons who might qualify as plaintiffs to 
bring suit even if subsequent purchasers are disqualified 
3 The complaint must be verified 
Section 740(2) requires the complaint in a derivative suit to 
be verified, i e, sworn to Compare Federal Rules of Civri 
Procedure, Rule 23 1, Surowitz u Hilton Hotels Corp, 383 
US 363 (1966) This requirement provides some protection 
against groundless litigation without deterring suits brought 
in good faith 
4 Option holders and convertible debenture holders 
are not permitted to sue 
Arguments may be made that long-term creditors and 
investors with the privilege of becoming shareholders by the 
exercise of options or conversion rights should be permitted to 
bring derivative suits These arguments, however, appear to 
involve the substantive rights of these various classes of 
investors more than the procedures required for the assertion 
of derivative rights on behalf of the corporation See e g 
Hamv Kerkor wn, 32 i A 2d 215 (Del Ch 1974), rev'd in part, 
347 A 2d 133 (Del 1975) Therefore section 740(1) does not 
permit option holders or convertible debenture holders to 
serve as derivative plaintiffs 
5 There must be prior notice and demand on directors 
in most circumstances 
The purpose of a demand on the board of directors is to 
stimulate the ooard of directors to enforce the rights of the 
corporation on its own Modern trends in corporate gover-
nance, particularly the increasing number of outside directors 
and greater director sensitivity to their roles in the corpora-
tion and to the possibility of personal liability, improve the 
likelihood that the board of directors will weigh carefully the 
shareholder's demand Therefore, section 740(2) requires an 
allegation with particularity of the demand made, if any, on 
the board of directors On the other hand, there may be 
circumstances showing that a demand on the board of direc 
tors would be useless and in those circumstances it should be 
sufficient to allege the reasons why the plaintiff did not make 
the demand 
Of itself, the reje:tion by the board of directors of the 
shareholder's demand neither permits nor precludes the 
shareholder's suit 
6 A court may stay a derivative suit while the board of 
directors investigates 
The last sentence of section 740(2) provides that if the 
corporation undertakes an investigation, the court may stay 
the proceeding until the investigation of the charges made in 
the demand or complaint is completed The purpose of this 
stay is to preserve the right of the board of directors to 
consider whether or not to seek to enforce on its own the 
corporation's claim 
7 Recovery of reasonable expenses of suit, including 
attorneys' iees, if suit brought without good cause 
